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ABSTRACT   
Segmentation of the rural credit markets is present in various countries in the world but remain only 
partially understood. This thesis contributes to filling this gap. Using data from the rural credit markets 
of Thua Thien Hue Province in Phu Thuong Commune it aims to: (i) identify the main providers, 
borrower groups and their characteristics in the credit market; (ii) to learn about the performance of the 
segmented credit market; (iii) and to explain the reasons and conditions for rural credit market 
segmentation.  
This study presents an analytical literature survey and analysis of survey data which includes the results 
from a household survey, group discussions, individual interviews and observations. The analyses are 
conducted from the viewpoint of both the lenders and the borrowers to see how their particular 
characteristics influence their credit transactions as well as market segmentation.  
The results of the research reveals that the formal, semi formal and informal sector co-exists and 
operates in the rural credit markets of Phu Thuong commune. Beside the similarities in business place 
and responsibility in supplying loans to local clients, each credit sector have had particular characteristics 
in term of kind of credit products/services, number of transactions, credit transaction terms, as well as 
process of disbursing credit. 
The segmentation of Phu Thuong credit market is recognized in each term/clause of a credit 
transaction. In that light, the credit market is segmented in aspects of purpose, duration, interest rate, 
and amount of loans.  
With regard to loan purposes, the segmentation is not only seen from the credit sector aspect but 
also in terms of the different lenders.  
Regarding to duration of loans, formal lenders have provided loans with long duration, informal 
sector have lent short period loans, while semi formal lenders have dominated medium term loans. 
From borrower’s aspect, segmenting within each household group by loan duration is not obvious.  
In terms of loan size, agricultural households have obtained credit with the smallest amount on 
average, and a major part coming from the formal sector. The mixed group and nonfarm group have 
been not much different in credit volume. However, the biggest part in volume of credit of agricultural 
households and mixed households has come from the formal sector, whereas, in the nonfarm group, the 
biggest share has belonged to the informal sector. Though segmented by loan size, the market has still 
been based on the interaction among credit sectors, as only 4.44% of households have just obtained 
credit from one of the sectors.   
The segmentation of interest rate has been obvious among credit sectors, especially between formal 
sector and the two other sectors. Average interest rate of loans in formal sector is lowest, approximately 
a half of that in semi formal sector and informal one. From borrowers’ aspect, the segmentation of 
interest rate among household groups has not been clear because of the variety of credit sources from 
which households ask for loans.  
Regarding the reasons of segmenting credit market, the policy issue, information and conditions of 
transaction have been recorded as the main reasons.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The rural financial market, in general, is constituted of formal and various segments of an informal 
sector (Yadav et al., 1992). In the particular case of Vietnam, not only these two sectors, there is the 
simultaneous existence in rural market of formal, semi-formal and informal credit institutions (Marsh et 
al., 2006) despite a significant difference in interest rates among sectors. In this light, the formal credit 
sector in rural areas was regarded as “the sector in which loan transactions are regulated by legislation 
and other public policy requirements” (Ramachandran & Swaminathan, 2001) or was emphasized like 
“bound by the legal regulations of a country” (Ellis, 1992), whereas informal sector is “not regulated by 
public authorities, and the terms and conditions attached to each loan are personalized” (Ramachandran 
& Swaminathan, 2001) and transactions in the informal sector rarely involve legal documentation 
(Aryeetey et al., 1997). With semi-formal sector, it is rare that scholars define this concept. It seems 
only to be a specific category of certain countries. It provides loans through social political unions in 
rural areas, and the level of activity of this section in a region is related to priority programs of the 
government, consignment of the banks, and the activity of unions (Marsh et al., 2006).  
In fact, the credit contracts among these sectors are known to be extremely different, not only in the 
terms and conditions of contracts but also in borrowers involved. A certain group of loanees gets loans 
from given lenders, but not others, or they obtain credit from several sources with differences in size, 
interest rate, duration as well as using purpose. The questions that should be posed in this context are, is 
there segmentation and if so, is it a problem; is there a good match between availability of credit, their 
characteristics and the conditions, and the needs of the borrowers in the rural market in Vietnam. To 
make clear a part of these questions, this study intends to understand how the credit market is 
segmented in rural region of Thua Thien Hue Province with Phu Thuong Commune as a case study.  
As has been recognized by many researchers, financial capital plays an important role in rural 
development. According to Zoetelief (1999), credit is the most important instrument for achieving an 
economic spin-off for the rural poor. Rural households have to make decisions how to invest and what 
inputs to buy, relying on the level of credit they receive (Bao Duong & Izumida, 2002) and how they 
access to credits. The obstacles on access to financial services, in particular savings, may be a main 
constraint to their participation and contribution to economic growth. Conversely, wider and better 
access to credit can significantly improve the welfare of low income households. These include 
protection against risks and economic shocks (Aubé, 2010; Diagne et al., 2000; Peachey & Roe, 2004); 
more efficient allocation of resources (Merton and Brodie 1995 cited in Peachey & Roe, 2004), 
improvement of basic needs, as well as women’s empowerment (Aubé, 2010).  
Because of the importance of credit access, several programs have been implemented to improve 
rural households’ access to credit (Diagne et al., 2000). However, rural people do not easily get a loan 
so they remain credit-constrained. Only 5% in Africa and about 15% of the farmers in Asia and Latin 
America have had access to formal credit, and the inequity of  access is shown by that 5% of the 
borrowers have received 80% of the credit on average across developing countries (Vega 1983, Adams 
& Vogel 1986, Braveman & Guasch 1986, cited in Bali Swain, 2001). 
In Vietnam, many credit programs and projects have been implemented in rural areas by 
Government as well as Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), especial the subsidized credit 
programs for the poor. These programs have divided borrowers into target groups and non-target 
groups. It means that there are groups who have been excluded from the programs whereas others have 
gotten benefit from those. Beside that, the formal financial institutions with strict regulations have also 
created difficulties in access for people who demanded credit. The formal sector has been specialized in 
lending for production activities only (Bao Duong & Izumida, 2002). Moreover, Barslund & Tarp 
(2008) found out from a survey of 932 rural households that up to 70 per cent of all formal loans 
required collateral to ensure repayment in 2002. The banks even have asked borrowers for collateral 
with the loans that did not need any collateral in regulations of the State (McCarty & Leader, 2001). In 
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the context only 60 percentage of total rural households in Vietnam had land use certificates in the 
early 2000s (Hung 2005 cited in Phuong 2006), which are mentioned as principal assets of rural 
residents. The people in this area have faced the fact that the formal credit segment is available for only 
some certain groups but not for all groups. On the contrary, semi formal and informal credit sector are 
more flexible in procedures, lending purposes as well as collateral conditions for loans. These situations 
have seemed to separate borrowers into the different groups in accessing to credit from the different 
sectors. 
Although formal sector has rapidly increased during last decades, according to Ho (2004), it, in some 
cases, does not satisfy the growing credit demand, and many borrowers turn to the informal credit 
sector to meet their production and consumption needs. In developing countries, a majority of rural 
households still rely on the informal market for their inter-temporal transfer of resources (Dufhues & 
Buchenrieder, 2005). Around 40% of households in Vietnam did not have access to formal credit 
sources in 2001 (BWTP, unknown year). While many credit programs of the formal sector provide 
loans at subsidized level, the informal credit market supplies loans to rural households at interest rates 
normally higher (Ho, 2004), on average about three times higher (Marsh et al., 2006). Although the 
cost for getting a loan is so high, many rural households still go to the informal and semi-formal credit 
sector when they have a demand. Statistical data from GSO (2000) showed that the share of the 
informal sector is more than a half in the rural market, about 54% of all outstanding loans in 1997/98. 
Moreover, among people, who had obtained loans, 36% of the total households have suffered from 
credit rationing (Bao Duong & Izumida, 2002).  
With above evidences, it may be assumed that the segmentation of rural credit market is also an 
issue that has been revealed not only in a specific country but also over the world. However, how this 
market is segmented is not fully understood. Therefore, policy makers find difficulties to have sound 
policies to facilitate farmers to have better access to credit. That is why it is necessary for studying this 
issue from multiple aspects.  
The main purposes of this research includes: (i) to clarify the main providers, borrower groups and 
their characteristics in rural credit market in Vietnam; (ii) to explore the performance of the segmented 
credit market and (iii) to explain the reasons and conditions for rural credit market segmentation.  
The study does not try to test any hypotheses but it investigated the segmentation of the rural credit 
market under aspect of households’ income generating activities. The analysis was conducted by 
viewpoints of both lenders and borrowers to see how their particular characteristics influence on credit 
transactions as well as market segmentation. The division of rural credit market into three sectors 
(formal, semiformal and informal) was chosen for discussing the segmentation in this study.  
This thesis is structured in six chapters. Following the introduction chapter, relevant literature is 
reviewed in Chapter two. Chapter three describes and discuss the situation of rural finance in Vietnam. 
Next, Chapter four explains research methodology that is used to explore issues in the study and 
background of study site. The results and discussions are expressed in Chapter five. Finally, Chapter six 
summarizes the conclusions of the research. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Basic theories of credit segmentation 
The segmentation of market was defined by Ghate et al (1992) as the “existence of several sub-markets 
separated by boundaries across which the flow of credit is impeded by information barriers”. Therefore 
“an increase in the supply of funds in one segment does not necessarily increase the availability or 
reduce the price of credit in another, although some funds do flow between segments” (Ghate et al., 
1992).  
The segmentation in financial markets has been regarded under country or consumer outlooks 
(Bijmolt et al., 2004) as well as geographic, class of borrowers or region perspectives (Montgomery, 
1991). The approach to examine the consumer segmentation is different from the country 
segmentation in credit market. Classification of country segmentation is usually based on aggregate data 
(at the national level) reflecting demographic, socio-economic, political, and cultural factors (Jain 1993; 
Nachum 1994 cited in Bijmolt et al., 2004), instead of consumer-level and domain-specific variables 
(Bijmolt et al., 2004). Furthermore, these authors emphasized that the geographical factors play essential 
role but they do not offer a complete explanation for the country segmentation. With consumer 
segmentation, the assessment is relied on four demographic variables: age, marital status, income, and 
type of community (Bijmolt et al., 2004). Bijmolt and fellow-workers added that the consumer 
segmentation is flexible in the sense that obtained segments can be cross-national or country-specific. 
The probability a consumer belongs to a particular segment depends on his/her demographics and on 
country segment membership. Although the segments are quite stable over time, the segmentation will 
not be excessively fixated, and the tendencies could be monitored regarding demographics and 
ownership levels of particular financial services (Bijmolt et al., 2004). 
To explain for the existence of credit market segmentation, several competing theories have been 
raised by many authors. According to Bali Swain (2009), the traditional explanation has been based on 
the view point about monopolist power of the village moneylenders. With this power, he/she can 
charge very high interest rates due to lack of competition.  
The second reason, the differences in the costs of screening, monitoring and contract enforcement 
due to the imperfect information and enforcement (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990) across lenders cause the 
segmentation (Bali Swain, 2009; Barslund & Tarp, 2008). In situation of imperfect information and 
costly contract enforcement, market failures arise from adverse selection and moral hazard, which 
undermine the operation of financial markets. Aryeetey et al, (1997) explained that adverse selection 
occurs as interest rates increase and borrowers with worthwhile investments become discouraged from 
seeking loans. The quality in general of loan applications changes disadvantageously as interest rates 
increase. Further, the risk of default will increase due to borrowers have an incentive to carry out 
higher returns projects, but which have greater risks attached. Moral hazard happens when some 
applicants borrow to pay for existing loans or borrow without the intention or the capacity to pay back 
loans (Aryeetey et al., 1997). This author emphasized that poor information systems encourage 
segmentation by raising the cost to formal institutions of obtaining credible information on both 
systemic and idiosyncratic risks for all, especially for the largest clients. In contrast, informal agents get 
local monopoly power, but constrains their ability to scale up since they rely on localized, personal 
information. The lender can use direct (geography and kinship, interlinkages with other markets and 
collateral, usufruct loans and rotating savings and credit associations) or indirect mechanisms (interest 
rates, terminations and market interlinkages) to bridge these problems (Bali Swain, 2009). Having the 
same point of view, McCarty & Leader (2001), in a research in Vietnam, claimed that the lending 
interest rate charged by the banks (VBSP and VBARD) was only weakly responsive to demand and 
supply conditions, and hence may be leading to market segmentation (McCarty & Leader, 2001).  
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The third view explained the segmentation in the rural credit markets as relating to the quality or 
lack of collateral that the borrower can offer to the lender (Bali Swain, 2009). Clients can be treated 
differently in interest rate or/and size of loan depending on the level of satisfying lenders’ requirements 
on collaterals. Some cases, loanees can be excluded from a given credit lender and have to seek credit 
from other sources. Due to these conditions, the segmentation of credit market has been occurring as a 
result. 
Other researchers, Aryeetey et al. (1997), synthesized three theoretical paradigms for examining the 
cause of financial market segmentation. They include policy-based explanation, structural and 
institutional explanations, and synthesizing alternative explanations. 
For the first one, the influence emerged which favored ceiling policies on deposit and loan rates 
leading to raising the demand for, and depressing the supply of funds. Unfulfilled demand for investable 
funds then forces financial intermediaries to ration credit by non-price allocation mechanism, whereas 
informal lenders develop at uncontrolled rates. As a result, a segmented credit market will allow 
borrowers to obtain funds at subsidized rates while others must seek credit in inefficient, expensive 
informal markets (Aryeetey et al., 1997).  
For the second one, Aryeetey et al. (1997) focused on imperfect information on creditworthiness 
and differences in the costs of screening, monitoring, and contract enforcement across lenders which 
were regarded above. In addition, these authors emphasized that, segmentation may also come from 
weaknesses in the infrastructure that supports the financial system, such as the legal infrastructure in 
insurance function, in regime of property rights used for collateral (land tenure case in low income 
countries). Therefore, market segments that formal banks  exclude from these institutional reasons, may 
nevertheless be served by informal agents who use personal relationships, social sanctions, and collateral 
substitutes to ensure payment. 
The last one, Aryeetey et al. (1997) claimed that the explanations for segmentation mentioned 
earlier are not necessarily mutually exclusive, hence, the authors raised other explanations based on 
perceptions that were cited from Ghate (1988), Bell (1990), Roemer and Jones (1991), and Seibel 
(1989). In this light, informal sector credit can be viewed as residual finance, satisfying spillover demand 
by those excluded from the formal market.  
In this paper, we relied on the characteristics of borrowers and lenders, which focused on 
borrowers’ income generating activities and lenders’ regulations (both direct and indirect mechanism) 
and concentrated on the consumer segmentation of rural credit market on both formal, semi formal, 
and informal sector to make clear the features and performances of the credit market segmentation and 
explain the reasons for existence of the credit market segmentation in Phu Thuong commune.  
2.2 Issues of the rural credit investigated in previous studies 
Several studies relating to rural credit have been conducted over the world and in Vietnam, 
however, different studies focuses on different aspects. In points of views of subsector approach, some 
authors focused only on the informal sector (Aryeetey, 1998; Dat, unknown year; Madestam, 2005; 
Ramachandran & Swaminathan, 2001; Zoetelief, 1999) or only on the formal sector (Binswanger & 
Khandker, 1992; Dufhues & Buchenrieder, 2005; Phuong, 2006). In contrast, many other researchers 
looked at both formal and informal sectors (Aryeetey, 1992; Aryeetey, 2008; Atieno, 2001; Ayyagari et 
al., 2008; Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Besley et al., 2001). Clearly, there are different points of view on 
subsectors of previous studies.  
The topics regarded in the studies were also various, from lending policies and governance issues 
(Atieno, 2001; Corpuz, 2007; Gonzalez-Vega, 2003; Pham & Lensink, 2007) to the financial structure 
in the rural market (Anand & Galetovic, 2000; Wickramanayake, 2003) and the roles and/or effects of 
finance to production and wealth of rural households as well as natural resources (Akram et al., 2008; 
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Baumann, 2001; Binswanger & Khandker, 1992; Gordon, 2000; Tuan, 2006; United Nations Capital 
Development Fund, 2004).  
Besides, other authors have examined about the reasons for successes and/or failures of rural credit 
programs in rural areas (Besley, 1994; Coleman, 1999; Gugerty, 2003; Huppi & Feder, 1990; Paxton et 
al., 1996; Timothy, 1994; Yaron, 1994). Moreover, the participation and reflection of households as 
well as other actors in rural credit markets were also discussed by several authors (Bao Duong & 
Izumida, 2002; Besley et al., 2001; Komicha, 2007; Marsh et al., 2006).  
Access to credit was the most hot aspect that have been explored by many studies but most of them 
have emphasized on determinants or/and constraints in access to credit (Bofondi & Gobbi, 2006; 
Diagne, 1999; Diagne et al., 2000; Dufhues & Buchenrieder, 2005; Schenk et al., 1999; Zander, 1992).  
The relationship between informal and formal sector in financial markets have been studied by 
several authors (Aryeetey, 1992; Floro & Ray, 1997; Guirkinger, 2008; Pagura & Kirsten, 2006). 
Recently, several authors have explored rural credit segmentation (Aryeetey et al., 1997; Bali Swain, 
2001; Bijmolt et al., 2004; Dodson & Koenig, 2004; Edwards, 1988; Montgomery, 1991; Nissanke & 
Aryeetey, 2006; Pinheiro & Moura, 2003; Poon et al., 1998; Tschach, 2003; Yadav et al., 1992), but 
they have just focused on some certain aspects. Therefore, the segmentation is not fully understood.  
The above topics have a more or less connection by direct or indirect way with theme of the credit 
market segmentation in this paper. The contents of related literatures are discussed deeply in the 
following section.   
2.3 Segmented credit markets and the segments’ characteristics 
The topic of credit market segmentation concerned not only specific countries but also over the 
world, from the developed countries in Europe and America to the developing ones in Africa and Asia. 
Moreover, the detail aspects of segmenting that the researchers have paid attention to were also 
diversified, including the reasons and performances as well as characteristics of credit market 
segmentation, the distinction between segmentation and parallelism in credit market, the differences 
among segments in segmented credit market.     
Bijmolt et al. (2004) studied on country and consumer segmentation in credit market and have 
drawn conclusions that both country segments and consumer segments were highly interpretable in 
European countries. Moreover, consumer segmentation was related to demographic variables such as 
age and income. In a research on agricultural credit markets in USA over the 1991 -  1993 and 2001 - 
2002 periods, Dodson & Koenig (2004), indicated that the cooperative Farm Credit System (FCS) 
lenders were more likely to serve full-time commercial farmers and farmers who live in less competitive 
credit markets regions, while, commercial banks were more likely to serve small, part-time, and hobby 
farmers.  
According to previous studies, segmentation of credit market is affected by many factors, including 
the characteristics of lenders as well as borrowers’ and other external elements. Zoetelief (1999) 
believed that financial decisions do not take place in isolation but they are influenced by various socio-
cultural, economic and ecological factors. Similarly, a certain credit transaction can only happen if a 
series of conditions were satisfied.  
Pham & Lensink (2007) added that the amount of credit offered to a particular borrower not only 
reflects credit decisions by lenders but also reflects the choice of borrowers. Moreover, they pointed out 
an external factor affecting the segmentation of credit markets. From their viewpoint, the credit 
segmentation in Vietnam seemed to correspond with certain government policies designed to push the 
development of the private sector. Not only the reasons from government, Montgomery (1991), in a 
research on credit market in Italy, stressed that the geographical segmentation of capital markets may 
have deeper roots than government regulation, so that even regulatory harmonization, banks may not 
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be on an even footing in a particular local market, if their home country or the extent of their other 
operations differs. In Italy banking markets, he suggested that the geographical segmentation is possibly 
because of natural, as opposed to regulatory, barriers to capital mobility. 
Pinheiro & Moura (2003) analyzed the segmentation of credit market basing on asymmetry of 
information on borrower creditworthiness. They emphasized the importance of relationship banking as 
a source of information that causes the segmentation of the credit market. Moreover, these authors 
claimed that the main features of market segmentation were comparatively strong to changes in interest 
rates and the cost to outsiders of assessing borrower quality. Tschach (2003) also relied on theory of 
information asymmetries to explain for the credit market segmentation. This researcher focused on the 
transactions between banks and entrepreneurs instead of individual borrowers. He argued that, the 
asymmetry of information made difficult for banks to assess exactly whether certain enterprises are able 
and/or willing to repay their loans, therefore, it leaded to implicit interest rate ceilings. On the other 
hand, the reactions of  both banks and enterprises for the transactions were based on their RoI (return 
on investment). The author concluded, hence, as the result of a free market process, unregulated 
market forces lenders and borrowers to get a stable equilibrium in which the credit market was 
segmented into an informal (small loan) segment, a formal (large loan) segment and, in between, a 
“non-market” (medium loan) segment.  
Characteristics of lenders and borrowers induced them outreaching each other among credit 
segments. Klerk (2008) proposed the differences in financial demand of the different borrower groups 
to make clear for the segmentation in credit market. This author raised interpretation that the poor 
groups might need savings facilities and micro-credit to cover production costs and emergency 
expenses, hence, the main providers to the poor belonged to informal sector. To farmers and farmers’ 
organizations, processing and marketing is more capital intensive so the demand for more formal 
financial service providers is stronger, therefore, they probably require larger size of loan. Moreover, 
loans for farmers must take into account the time crops and livestock need to mature because farmers 
have no other source of income, thus, they can face difficulties if they have to start repaying loans too 
quickly. The author also mentioned for petty traders and households in marginal areas by the 
consideration that the first group may need credit to buy stock, which they hope to sell within a few 
days or weeks, while the latter was usually conducted on a small scale.  
In another research, Aryeetey (1992) suggested that aside from the operating costs of the agents 
involved, a number of factors, both economic and non-economic, may be crucial to the segmentation 
of the credit market. Some factors were listed as evidences for this view such as high transaction costs in 
seeking formal financial services, "political" costs (e.g. government tampering with private savings), and 
also direct institutional barriers. He expounded: "political" costs incline to undermine confidence in the 
formal system and in that connection keep at a distance many people who otherwise would have 
patronized it. Institutional barriers also result from a lot of bureaucratic requirements that people who 
needed financial services and who could probably have put some credit to sound economic use cannot 
satisfy.  
From research on the lending policies of informal, formal and semiformal lenders in Vietnam, Pham 
& Lensink (2007) concluded that sources of credit appears to be segmented not only according to the 
activities financed but also relying on collateral conditions. The authors gave evidence that households 
with collateral or with support by a guarantor, as well as clients who borrow for business-related 
activities are more likely to use formal and/or semiformal credit based on the positive significant 
coefficients of guarantor and collateral. Besides, the probability of using informal credit increases for 
female borrowers. In this light, they deduced that households without collateral and requiring loans for 
consumption purposes have a lower chance to obtain formal credit, hence, they will move towards the 
informal financial sector. 
Another cause that was used to interpret the segmentation in rural credit market comes from the 
incompatibility between the requirements of given lenders and borrowers’ conditions. From the 
observations in Nepal, Yadav et al. (1992) suggested that small, collateral-poor farmers are excluded 
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from the formal sector and are forced to depend on informal sector, which does not require collateral 
whereas borrowers from the formal sector are collateral-rich, large, productive farmers. In addition, 
Zoetelief (1999) found out that formal financial institutions favoured the wealthier and more influential 
farmers and failed to reach the rural poor, therefore, groups and co-operatives were viewed as popular 
alternatives in rural financing. They were believed to have a potential to reach the rural poor with the 
lower transaction costs due to that loans could be disbursed to groups or co-operatives instead of to 
many individual small farmers.  
The characteristics and performances of segmented credit market were also discussed by many 
researchers. Segmentation of financial markets in developing countries are often described in terms of 
that different groups of borrowers are served by different lending intermediaries (Conning & Udry, 
2005). Aryeetey (1992) claimed that the financial market is extensively segmented, in research on 
relationship between the formal and informal sectors of the financial market in Ghana. In another study, 
Aryeetey and his co-workers also drew the similar conclusion for the four countries Ghana, Malawi, 
Nigeria, and Tanzania. Formal and informal lenders were polarized at extreme ends of the market, with 
relatively little overlap of clientele in these countries (Aryeetey et al., 1997). They emphasized that the 
countries have substantially segmented financial markets, with weak linkages between formal and 
informal segments, and the differences in costs and risks cannot be fittingly explained for interest rate 
differentials among them. Furthermore, interest rates not only vary widely between formal and informal 
markets but also across informal institutions (Aryeetey et al., 1997).  
Through micro-econometric analysis of household surveys, Bao Duong & Izumida (2002) also 
recognized that the rural credit market in Vietnam was quite segmented. In this study, they found out 
the formal sector is specialized in lending for production activities whereas the lending purposes of 
informal sector were various. Research on microfinance in Vietnam, McCarty & Leader (2001), 
claimed that the segmentation can be looked at from the view point of households who can access and 
those who cannot access formal credit. According to these authors, the poor were mostly excluded 
from VBARD and may get once-off “loans” from VBSP, hence, the poor households must turn to 
relatives or private lenders for loans.  
In the other independent research in Puri, a district in India, Bali Swain (2001) identified that there 
was an existence of segmentation in Puri, in which the formal and the informal sectors show distinct 
characteristics about interest rate and lending purposes. The formal sector lent mainly for productive 
purposes at subsidized interest rates, whereas, the informal sector lends small loans for consumption 
purposes also, at comparatively higher interest rates. In addition, she found evidence of an inverse 
relationship between the interest rate and the marketability of the collateral offered by the borrowers to 
secure the loan from the informal sector.  
In segmented markets, there are broad differences in risk-adjusted returns since funds and 
information do not flow between segments. The customers also have limited access to different 
financial instruments, leading to low substitutability and few informal clients can obtain credit from 
more than one source (Aryeetey et al., 1997). In their study, Aryeetey and his partners revealed that 
financial flows from formal to informal markets are negligible. Though informal deposit mobilizers 
(except for ROSCAs ) often maintain bank accounts (89 percent of informal operators in Ghana, 82 
percent of them in Nigeria have a bank account), they generally have a limited capital base and little 
access to formal funds (Aryeetey et al., 1997). These authors affirmed that the main sources of the 
expanding supply of loanable funds by informal agents are mobilized savings and reinvested profits. 
Roemer & Jones (1991), in a research on markets in developing countries, claimed that both 
parallelism and segmentation have been revealed in credit markets of developing countries. These 
authors stressed that it is also useful to distinguish between a parallel market and a segmented market. In 
this respect, the financial repression hypothesis is related to parallelism, whereas the imperfect 
information paradigm implies that segmentation may persist in spite of liberalization (Roemer & Jones, 
1991).  
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The disparity among credit segments was considered by several authors. Based on an intensive 
survey of farm households in Nepal, Yadav et al. (1992) contrasted the functional differences among 
segments of the rural financial market. It was found that with formal sources, farm size and irrigation 
are major determinants of borrowing, whereas family size is the most decisive factor in borrowing from 
informal lenders. Furthermore, they claimed that there are at least two factors causing segmentation in 
the rural financial markets in Nepal. First, regulated interest rates in the formal sector lead to credit 
rationing that favours farm households with collateral, therefore, borrowers without collateral are 
excluded and hence have to rely on the informal sector. Second, the problem of moral hazard and 
adverse selection, which arises due to the asymmetric information in the rural financial market, is much 
less serious in informal lenders than in formal ones. Then, basing on the empirical evidences, they 
asserted that while market segmentation due to the different information structure is socially efficient, 
segmentation causing by the regulation of interest rates is not. Thus, given the differential informational 
structure, the formal sector tends to specialize in providing loans for production purposes, whereas the 
informal sectors plays the major role in the service of consumption loans.   
More detail, Aryeetey (1992) specified that formal credit is often rationed at a lower interest rate 
than informal lenders' rates. Moreover, the clients did not have to go through any personal harassment 
in seeking and repaying loans from formal source, as is often connected to borrowing from 
moneylenders. Obviously, borrowers would first seek institutional finance. He raised evidences that, in 
Ghana, credit from informal sources would only be sought after failure to obtain bank credit, and 54% 
of the entrepreneurs would first go to the bank while only 5% of them would contact a moneylender 
first and 23% would first search for from friends when credit is desired (Aryeetey, 1992).  
To explain the continued separation of the market as well as the co-existence of the segments, 
Chandravarkar (1987) affirmed that the persistence of the informal financial sector, on the one hand, 
was a response to the underdevelopment of the formal financial sector, on the other hand, it may be 
ascribed to the ‘autonomous’ nature of the informal sector, that is, its comparative advantage in 
exploiting information and low transaction costs (Chandravarkar 1987 cited in Pham & Lensink, 2007).  
Notwithstanding admitting the existence of segmentation in credit market, some studies still 
recognised the interactions  between  the  formal  and  informal  segments in  the areas  of credit 
allocation  and  savings  mobilization (Aryeetey, 1992). There were even the authors raising critical 
policy-related question that is whether segment-specific advantages can be translated into market 
efficiency, and measures to promote integration of segments may be necessary (Seibel 1989 cited in 
Aryeetey et al., 1997). 
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3 STATE OF RURAL FINANCE IN VIETNAM 
3.1 Background and innovative issues in rural financial market  
For more than two decades, Vietnam has been in a transitional process from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economy and is regarded as one of the fastest growing developing economies in 
the world (BWTP, unknown year; Pham & Lensink, 2007). Its gross domestic product (GDP) has 
steadily grown over the last years, expanding by about 7% per year (Corpuz, 2007). However, 
agricultural production still played a essential role in the Vietnamese economy at present with around 
70 per cent of the population equivalent 12.5 million households living in rural areas and relying on 
agriculture for their livelihood (Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Corpuz, 2007). The transition had significant 
impact on poverty alleviation. According to ADB (2007), the poverty rate was cut sharply between 
1993 and 2007, from 58% to 14.7% of the more than 80 million population (Bali Swain et al., 2008b; 
Corpuz, 2007). It was estimated that 85% of the poor lived in rural areas. Despite a rapid economic 
growth, the GDP per capita remained relatively low at about US$ 640 in 2005 (Corpuz, 2007).  
Since the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945, rural finance policy has 
always attended to the improvement of the rural poor’s lives. In 1947, the Production Credit 
Department was set up with the mandate of lending to farm households at subsidized interest rates using 
the national budget. At a later time, in 1951, the National Bank was formed to provide loans directly to 
farm households (Ngoc 2005 cited in Corpuz, 2007).   
When Vietnam was temporarily divided between the North and the South, while the bank system 
in the North continued providing cheap loans to farm households, the bank system in the South 
stopped extending loans to farmers. But when farms in the North were collectivized, direct lending also 
was halted to rural households in the region. Then, the rural households in the South were lent again 
for production recovery in 1975 after the American army was driven out of the country. Up to 1978, 
the farms in the South were also collectivized, therefore, state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) cut 
their lending for individuals and rural households since they were mandated to allocated credit only to 
state enterprises and production cooperatives (Corpuz, 2007).  
In the late eighties of the 20th century, Vietnam was well-known in the world with “Doi Moi” 
process. Initiated in 1986, “Doi Moi” literally means “change” and “newness” and is the Vietnamese 
term for reform and renovation. It was aimed at restructuring institution, regulation, administration, 
investment and foreign trade structure and policies to transform the centrally planned economy into a 
market economy with 'socialist characteristics' (Bryant 1998 cited in Phuong, 2006). After the 
innovation, there have been a lot of changes in social economic development in general, and in 
financial system in particular. 
Before Doi Moi, Vietnam’s banking system was a mono-tier system, in which the State Bank of 
Vietnam (SBV) played the role of both central and commercial bank. With the position of central bank, 
SBV regulated monetary policy, managed the national reserves and issued banknotes. As the role of 
commercial bank, it mobilized savings from public and distributed credit to enterprises. After the 
reform, the banking system switched to a two-tier system in 1988. SBV, since then, has only 
undertaken managing responsibilities of Central bank. The commercial banking responsibilities has 
been transferred to four SOCBs (BWTP, unknown year). These commercial banks resumed providing 
loans to individuals and rural households (Hao, 2002 cited in Corpuz, 2007).  
Since 1996 until now, many remarkable policies and legal reforms have been promulgated relating 
to operations of financial system in Vietnam. They are listed below: 
•  Government Decree 178, and Prime Minister’s Decision 67 (both declared in 1999) permitted a 
larger flexibility for commercial banks in deciding on loan guarantee requirements;  
•  SBV Decision 241 in 2000 switched to a base rate method of setting interest rates; 
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•  The Law on Credit Institutions (proclaimed in 1997 and then adjusted and supplemented in 2004) 
regarded to registration of non-credit institutions with banking activities; 
•  Politburo Directive 57 (10th  October 2000) reviewed the operation process of the People Credit 
Funds (PCFs) and guided to consolidation and improvement of the PCF system; 
•  Civil Code (2005) clarified rights and obligations with regard to private lending and borrowing; 
• Co-operative Law (2003) provided a framework for the development of credit co-operatives 
(McCarty & Leader, 2001). 
In order to help rural households move toward a better quality of life and improvement of income 
through expanding their production activities, at the same time awareness of the importance of a 
developed rural economy, many credit supported programs were formulated by the government 
institutions in Vietnam during the recent decades. Most of these programs had a credit component with 
interest rates which are heavily subsidized, about two times lower compared to commercial interest 
rates. They are either by the National Government or by Provincial Governments and are intended to 
increase rural production, stimulate the growth of business enterprises, eradicate hunger, and alleviate 
poverty.  
The program for agro-forestry development was promulgated by Decision 67 in 1997.  All farmers 
can get loans from this program. The maximum amount of loan that a household can obtain without 
collateral is VND 10 million. The interest rate is 1.03% per month for loans that are to be repayed in a 
year or less and 1.18% per month for long-term loans.  
The program of Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction (HEPR) also named “the 135 
program” launched by the Vietnamese government in 1997, focusing on improving poor people's 
access to financial services, specially in rural regions (BWTP, unknown year). Under this program, 
cheap loans (interest rate of 0.5% per month for borrowers who live in remote and marginal areas, 
0.65% for other ones) were provided to the rural poor with purposes for the children education, for 
creating employments, for agriculture and forestry production, and for the protection of the 
environment. The first phase of HEPR ended in 2005 and it is now in the second phase of 
implementation, covering the period 2006-2010. The maximum of loan size without collateral is VND 
20 million (Corpuz, 2007). 
The Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development (MARD) operate a variety of microfinance schemes, called “the 120 program” 
supporting reforestation and job creation. They involve highly subsidised lending requiring repayment, 
although anecdotal information suggests a high level of defaults. The program lent nearly 50,000 clients 
1,070 billion VND (equivalent $75 million). Loans were delivered with 0.6  percent monthly interest 
rate and duration up to 36 months (McCarty & Leader, 2001). Similarly, the MARD program for 
reforesting five million hectares provided credit with free or low interest rate (7% per year) to farm 
households for reforestation activity (McCarty & Leader, 2001). 
The program aims at implementing the Prime Minister’s Decision 80 in 2002 that encouraged the 
use of agricultural products through contracting. According to the Decision, the Government provided 
credit for 70% of planting costs with interest of 3% per year in a period of 8 years through the State’s 
Development Credit Fund to producers and processors who have the contract for use the agricultural 
products. 
In 2004, with Forest Protection and Development Law, the State allocated natural forest and land 
for planting production forests and the people who are allocated forest lands can use the land as 
collateral. To support for this law, the Government provided low interest preferential credit for 70% of 
planting costs to farmers and forest enterprises for establishing the production forest. 
The State Government’s Resolution 120 allows a cooperative to borrow from the State Treasury a 
maximum loan of VND 100 million at 0.5 percent interest rate per month with the five years duration 
(Corpuz, 2007). 
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In 2009, the Prime Minister promulgated two Decisions (No.131 and No.443) on subsidizing 4% 
interest rate to all individuals, households, companies, cooperatives for production purposes. According 
to these decisions, the interest rate that the borrowers have to pay in practice for their loans equals to 
the interest rate which was required by banks minus 4%. The Government will pay for these 
differentials. Maximum duration that borrowers are subsidized is 24 months. This support will be 
prolonged to 2011. 
Most projects or programs of the Government were disbursed through the state-owned financial 
institutions in which Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) and Vietnam 
Bank for Social Policy (VBSP) are the major deliverers.  
Formal, semi-formal, and informal sectors exist side by side in Vietnam credit market (Chi, 2004; 
Corpuz, 2007) in which formal credit is expanding its share of total credit, while in parallel, a sizeable 
informal sector continues to operate. Different needs in the loan market are served by different 
segments, and the formal sector focuses almost entirely on production loans and asset accumulation 
(Barslund & Tarp, 2008).  
Currently, rural credit is provided by 5 State-Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), 20 Rural Joint 
Stock Commercial Banks (RJCBs), 905 People Credit Funds (PCFs), 70 credit cooperatives (BWTP, 
unknown year; Ngoc 2005 cited in Corpuz, 2007; McCarty & Leader, 2001), and a lot of lenders from 
semiformal and informal sector. Among the SOCBs engaged in rural lending, the VBARD and VBSP 
are the most important in terms of total outreach and total loan portfolio devoted to the rural sector 
(Corpuz, 2007) 
The market remains dominated by VBARD and VBSP. The lending interest rate charged by these 
banks was only weakly responsive to demand and supply conditions (McCarty & Leader, 2001). The 
participation of rural people in credit market increased over time. Data from the 1992-93 Vietnam 
Livings Standards Survey revealed that 47 percent of rural households had taken loans. By 1997-98, this 
figure rose to 54.67 percent (McCarty & Leader, 2001), much higher in comparison with non-
transition developing countries such as Uganda (10.25%)or Peru (29.50%) (Pham & Lensink, 2007). It 
is recorded that for all sources of credit, loans provided to rural households are less risky than loans 
provided to urban households, whereas loans for business and consumption purposes have a higher 
default rate than housing loans (Pham & Lensink, 2007).  
In short, Vietnam banking system had a lot of changes in both structure and function in the past 
decades, especially after “Doi Moi”. Great number of policies and legal reforms were promulgated 
relating to operations of financial system. The financial system has seen a significant development in 
operating scale. Many projects and programs which comprise credit component were implemented in 
rural areas. Therefore, the number of rural clients is increasing over time.  
3.2 Formal credit sector 
With the above regarded concept, the formal rural financial sector in Vietnam comprises system of 
SOCBs, RJCBs,  PCFs (BWTP, unknown year) which are established by legal documents (Law on 
Credit Institutions, Governmental Decrees, etc,.). 
This sector is characterized by the dominance of SOCBs with a lending share of 73.5 per cent of the 
total credit to the whole economy (World Bank, 2002 cited in Pham & Lensink, 2007). Among them, 
VBSP, VBARD, and PCFs are major credit suppliers to rural households. 
In 2002, VBSP was the leading micro-credit provider to poor households in rural areas with 58% of 
the market share, followed by VBARD with 24% while PCFs had a 3% market share of the rural credit 
market (BWTP, unknown year). By 2003, these providers reached approximately 7 million households, 
among them 3 million rural households, equivalent to over 90% of the outreach of rural financial 
services in Vietnam (BWTP, unknown year). 
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3.2.1 Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development  
One of the significant developments that appeared immediately after the restructuring of the 
Vietnamese banking system was the creation of the VBARD in 1988, separating from the State Bank of 
Vietnam. This bank has the most extensive network, containing around 2,000 branches nationwide 
with a registered capital of 5.17 billion VND and a trust investment of US$ 600 million* (Ngoc, 2005 
cited in Corpuz, 2007). In 2001 VBARD served about 35% of low-income households (Chi, 2004).  A 
report about nine provincial branches showed that almost half of bank loan funds went to loans of over 
5 million dong ( scale of a small loan is less than 5 million VND according to the bank’s definition) 
where as 16 percent of its customers were getting loans of only up to one million dong (McCarty & 
Leader, 2001).  
Up to now, VBARD has been the largest provider of financial services to rural areas and the second 
largest provider to poor households. By the end of year 2003, VBARD distributed credit to 0.8 million 
of poor households accounting for 15% of total of poor households who obtain formal loans in the 
whole country (Hung 2005 cited in Phuong, 2006). 
The first financial function of this bank was to provide directly financial services to rural households 
in agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors. In 2004, VBARD’s outstanding  loans to farm households 
was about VND 82 billion, equivalent to about 58% of the bank’s total loan portfolio. Approximately 
90% of its total funds for lending of this bank were mobilized from savings and deposits. The rest of its 
funds came from borrowings and entrust investment projects, mostly from the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank. From the previous survey, McCarty & Leader, 2001 found that the 
minimum deposit accepted by VBARD branches is 50,000VND but result from key informant 
interview has shown that at present, this standard has been raised to 100,000 VND.  
VBARD supplied borrowers with loans for farm production purpose, for business operations, for 
seeking employment abroad, for procurement of vehicles including motorbikes, housing loan, and loans 
for recovery from natural calamities. Repayment rate of loans in this institution was high, ranging from 
between 98% to 100% (Corpuz, 2007).  
VBARD required no collateral for i) loans amounting to 30 million VND if the purpose of the loan 
is for farm production; ii) loans of 50 million VND for households that are engaged in fisheries, 
livestock raising or suffering from avian influenza; and iii) loans of 20 million VND for exported labor 
(Corpuz, 2007) 
Group lending techniques, in which credit was disbursed through joint liability groups (JLGs) has 
been employed by VBARD, to increase its outreach in rural areas. The JLGs played the role as social 
collateral which replaces physical collateral (Izumida & Duong 2001 cited in Phuong, 2006). This 
technique has been applied by support of rural organizations including political and administrative 
organizations such as Farmer Union, Woman Union, and Veteran Union (VU) as well as the 
indigenous village groups.  
3.2.2 Vietnam Bank for Social Policy  
The Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) known as a non-profit bank was established in 1995 by the 
Prime Minister’s Decision 525. At that time, VBP was a part of VBARD to serve credit for the poor 
with subsidized interest rate. In October 2002, VBP was separated from VBARD and became 
independent bank named Vietnam Bank for Social Policy by the Prime Minister’s Decision 131.  
Since 2002, VBSP has offered widespread subsidized credit to poor households, totalling about 
US$452 million† in credit to some 2.7 million households (World Bank 2002 cited in Pham & Lensink, 
2007). By the end of the year 2003, these figures increased to approximately 10,349 billion VND for 
                                              
* Approximately  10.8 billion VND (at 1USD = 18,000 VND)  
† Approximately  8.136 billion VND (at 1USD = 18,000 VND)  
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about 2.8 million of poor households (Hung, 2005 cited in Bali Swain et al., 2008a). The  loan size in 
average was 3 million VND with maximum loan term of 36 months (Bali Swain et al., 2008a) 
This bank lends to production purposes, also lends to students for their tuition fees and other 
expenditure during study time. The lending interest rate of VBSP is two times lower than that in other 
lenders (from 0.5 percent to 0.65 percent per month depending on beneficiaries). Therefore, its 
capacity in saving mobilization is limited because this bank cannot mobilize deposits and saving at 
market interest rate. The operational capital of the bank mainly depends on State’s budget.   
To get the loans from VBSP, applicants are not required collateral security but they have to be 
members of the JLGs which are organized by local mass organizations such as Woman Union, Farmer 
Union, Veteran Union, Youth Union (YU) and so on. These organizations have played a very 
important role in selecting good borrowers, in guiding borrowing procedures, and in monitoring loan 
repayments. Amount of JLGs in VBSP was about 300,000 groups (Corpuz, 2007).  
3.2.3 People Credit Funds 
After the collapse of an earlier cooperative system, PCFs were established in 1993 by the Prime 
Minister’s Decision 390. They were modeled upon the Caisse Populaire system in Quebec, Canada 
with support from Development International Desjardins (DID) (BWTP, unknown year). The PCF is a 
cooperative credit organization whose operations are based on the principles of member volunteerism. 
The PCF system was organised in a two-tiered structure, with the Central Credit Fund (CCF) as the 
apex institution, and the individual PCFs working at retail level in communes. The main purposes of 
this institution is getting mutual support among members, enhancing individual and team strength to 
improve the effectiveness of their production, services, business activities, and their living standard. It is 
estimated that, in 2001, 56% of borrowers in PCFs were low-income households (BWTP, unknown 
year).   
PCFs are among the few organisations in Vietnam that aims to mobilise savings from members. As a 
result, PCFs have not relied on external subsidies, since 66% of their resources come from mobilised 
savings (BWTP, unknown year). 
Up to November 2004, this system included a Central People Credit Fund and about 900 PCFs, 
and reached nearly 1,000,000 members (BWTP, unknown year). Total of outstanding loans was VND 
3,089.132 billion (Hung, 2004). About 52% of the total outstanding loans of PCFs were used for 
agricultural production, 32% for traditional jobs, 7.5% for living conditions improvement, and 8.5% for 
other purposes (Corpuz, 2007). This institution has required simpler, more convenient procedures for 
obtaining loans. However, PCFs network covered just 6% of the rural households, of which 5% are the 
poor households. The loan repayment rate throughout the system remained high (above 98%) (Chi, 
2004; Phuong, 2006). 
3.2.4 Rural Joint Stock Commercial Banks   
The RJCBs system was formed in the early 1990s with the function to provide agricultural loans to 
rural households within the region where the head office is located. Almost RJCBs had been 
restructured or merged from rural credit cooperatives. Although established by contributing capital 
from their members, the Government has still kept 10% of the shares of RJCBs. The average registered 
capital of RJCBs was around VND 9-10 billion. Only 1.3% of total loans disbursed were the over due 
loans (Corpuz, 2007; McCarty & Leader, 2001). 
However, their role to lending in rural areas has been limited due to low capital base, small number 
of branches as well as inadequate banking services and heavy concentration in only two biggest business 
centres, namely Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. Up to now, it is estimated about 20 RJCBs that have 
served approximately 10,000 rural households (McCarty & Leader, 2001). With 15% of the credit 
market, RJCBs focused on lending Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and individual consumers 
(World Bank 2002 cited in Pham & Lensink, 2007). 
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The procedures for obtaining loans from such banks were simple. Most staffs of RJCBs have dual 
roles, as technical personnel and provider, thus, they also help the applicants complete the required 
documents. They have gotten advantage from friendly relationship with rural populations, and the use 
of simple lending procedures.  
3.3 Semiformal credit sector 
It is necessary to mention about semiformal credit sector in Vietnam context. As other developing 
countries, in the past decades, Vietnam got many supports from developed countries and non-
government organizations (NGOs) for investing in rural development. All major multilateral and 
bilateral donors and several NGOs had a part in microfinance programs in Vietnam (Putzeys 2002 cited 
in Bali Swain et al., 2008b). Hence, many credit funds, saving- and credit groups as well as community-
based credit organizations were set up and operate under social political unions’ management with 
budget support from NGOs or social political organizations. However, these organizations have not 
been specialized institutions in banking system that supply financial services long-term and regularly for 
all clients who have demand, but only provided credit and sometimes savings services within 
predetermined periods in set beforehand regions for target groups. Moreover, the Government has not 
conceded them as banks or microfinance institutions. Therefore, naming semiformal sector for these 
organizations seems suitable.  
Semiformal financial sector plays an increasingly important role in providing small loans to marginal 
groups, especially to the poor, ethnic minorities, and women living in Vietnam rural areas. This sector 
has relied on micro-financial programs implemented by mass organizations such as WU, FU, VU, 
Labour Confederation and so on. These organizations have owned and managed members’ savings and 
other funds that may come from donors. They have disbursed credit directly to target beneficiaries and 
beside that, implemented the activities of organizations themselves. In some cases, the lending activities 
were integrated with other activities in projects or programs that the lenders belong to as a component 
(Corpuz, 2007). 
The providers of semiformal sector have already provided financial services more than 15 years to 
the poor in whole country, particularly in rural and remote areas. Though volume of outstanding loans 
has been small in comparison with the formal system, they have adjusted their products and procedures 
for obtaining loans to meet the demand of the poor. In 2002, semiformal organisations had a 7% share 
of the rural credit market (BWTP, unknown year). The interest rate of loans from semiformal lenders 
was usually sustainable commercial interest rates (Tuan, 2006). 
Up to now, there were more than 50 international providers that have involved in semiformal credit 
sector in Vietnam (see appendix 3 for more details). They applied various lending models such as village 
banking, Grameen Bank, solidarity groups. Under these models, to obtain loans from these lenders, 
applicants have to be members of the groups which were formed by lenders or mass organizations. 
Several NGO lenders have diversified their services to meet borrowers’ demand. For instance, Capital 
Aid Fund for Employment of the Poor (CEP) has offered specific loans (housing improvement loans, 
weekly loans for labourers and monthly loans for common workers) and also provided micro insurance, 
covering risks related to health, life and livestock; Save the Children Japan has combined credit services 
with social services, such as child nutrition, antenatal care and food security; SNV has implemented a 
village banking model integrating training and market research assistance (BWTP, unknown year). To 
the present time, some NGOs have transferred its credit programs to local communities for self 
management such as Action Aid, Save the Children UK or reduced scale (Vietnam Plus) or prepared 
for transforming (Save the Children US).  
Semiformal credit lenders have several advantages for lending in rural areas. First of all, they have 
rarely required collateral for loans. In the “5 Cs” bases of making decision for lending (“5 Cs” including 
Capital, Collateral, Conditions, Character, Capacity to repay), they have focused only Character of 
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borrower. They have actively gotten information on their clients and potential customers as well. It 
might be one of essential factors for high repayment rate (more than 90%, especially 99% on average 
with programs implementing through WU) in this sector (BWTP, unknown year; Chi, 2004). 
Secondly, services are provided frequently, quickly and conveniently. Borrowers do not come a 
long way nor do they wait for a long time to get loans because they are in the community. Semiformal 
lenders usually apply simple procedures so customers also do not get trouble with long and complicated 
application form when asking for loans.  
Thirdly, semiformal lenders have usually provided small savings and also small loans with flexible 
repayment schedule (monthly or weekly instalments). Hence, their services are suitable to the poor’s 
demand.  
Furthermore, semiformal programs have often delivered loans with added assistant services such as 
regular savings with small amount (some schemes even focused primarily on mobilizing savings, with 
lending considered a secondary function (McCarty & Leader, 2001)), micro insurance covering risks 
related to health, life and livestock, production techniques, health care, building capacity for women, 
promoting human development and empowering members of the community, especially women and 
the poor, etc,.   
3.4 Informal credit sector 
Informal credit is the most diversified sector of rural credit market in term of providers, types and 
scales of lending, interest rates, durations as well as repayment methods. Informal financing regimes 
used to be the most important sources of rural credit. Most informal lenders provided short-term credit 
for emergency situations and vital demands of rural households that are not satisfied by the formal 
providers (Bali Swain et al., 2008a). It accounted for around 60–70% of total credit in the early 1990s 
(Pham & Lensink, 2007). Though, recently this sector has become less important due to the rapid 
expansion of formal sector with two typical representatives are VBARD and VBSP, the role of informal 
credit sector is still essential in rural credit markets.  
The major actors groups of the informal financial network providing credit to households include i) 
private moneylenders; ii) relatives, friends and neighbors; and iii) rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs) (BWTP, unknown year; Corpuz, 2007; McCarty & Leader, 2001; Pham & Lensink, 2007).  
Three types of private moneylenders exist in Vietnam. Firstly, the "traditional” type of lending has 
engaged lending in cash based on mutual confidence, using simple procedures, without any written 
loan contracts. Such traditional loans have been typically short-term, sometimes just for a few days. The 
second type is the "mortgage and pawn-broking”. It has been similar to the first type, in general, but 
the lenders have required collateral from borrowers. The last one of private moneylenders, which is 
increasingly common,  is through small traders, input suppliers, shops keepers and marketing agencies in 
local areas. This type can provide credit in cash or in kind (McCarty & Leader, 2001). The private 
moneylenders have been characterized by diverse, flexible operations. Their loans were usually small 
scale and short-term (specified by season or by days). The interest rates were recorded 3 to 20 times 
higher in comparison with other providers, ranging from 3% to 10% per month, even 20% per month 
in emergency cases (McCarty & Leader, 2001; Tuan, 2006). Moneylenders are usually wealthy families 
who live in the communities or villages near by their customers. Therefore, they have advantages in 
gathering information of their clients to secure for lending. 
For the second group, loans have usually been charged at either zero or low interest rates. Relatives, 
friends and neighbors have often provided loans without collateral or written contract. Repayment 
terms have been very flexible, even can be rescheduled in case of need. The using purposes of these 
loans have been quite varied for both consumption and production. Hence, these sources of lending 
have been often the first choices when rural households seek for credit, especially in marginal cases 
when households suffer from illness, production diseases, natural disasters or if households carry out 
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major events such as wedding or building houses. Form of loans from relatives, friends and neighbors 
can be made of both cash and kind.  
With ROSCAs, there are many names for this type of lenders in Vietnamese such as “ho” (in the 
North), “hui” (in the South), “phuong”, “chung”, or “bieu” groups. There are two common types of 
ho/hui including "credit type" and "supportive type". In the former the participants aim to earn 
additional income from interest, while the latter aims at mutual assistance among members (McCarty & 
Leader, 2001). Some of these ROSCAs have been created for special purposes such as weddings, 
funerals or New Year’s celebrations (BWTP, unknown year). These groups have commonly existed for 
generations but have rarely been officially acknowledged. Ho/hui groups are usually voluntarily 
established by a group of individuals from 5 to 20 people (McCarty & Leader, 2001). Members of 
ho/hui are normally acquainted with each other, live in the same regions or have similar jobs. They 
have mobilized regular savings from the members daily, weekly or monthly. ROSCAs have provided 
loans usually to members and sometimes to outsiders. Decisions on interest rates, membership, and loan 
amounts are either made jointly by all members, by a bidding process, or only by the leader/keeper of a 
ho/hui. Interest rates determined by bidding are common.  
3.5 Challenges of rural credit market in Vietnam  
Despite innovations during the last decades, the rural credit market in Vietnam still faces many 
challenges. It comprises the institutional aspect as well as implementing the operation of credit market. 
A fact of concern is that the poor have great difficulty in accessing formal commercial credit sources, 
especially the VBARD (Bao Duong & Izumida, 2002). Despite of improvments in  participator’s 
proportion in market, 36% of the total households suffered from credit rationing (Bao Duong & 
Izumida, 2002). The banking products in formal sector were not diversified and suitable for the poor in 
some cases. Though lending for groups was one of the bank’s innovation, it still remained problem that 
most of the lending through groups was the same size and duration to all “group” members whereas 
their credit demands as well as borrowing purposes were very various (Bali Swain et al., 2008a). A ‘one 
size fits all’ approach to spreading out credit was not going to be the most effective (Barslund & Tarp, 
2008). The banks did not pay attention to small savings that suits poor’s capacity.  Repayment schedules 
in most banks were yearly or at the end of lending duration so it may not be matching with the income 
flow and spending habit of the poor.  
The formal sector usually required land use certificates, houses or fixed assets for collateral (about 70 
per cent of all formal loans (Barslund & Tarp, 2008)) even for the loans without any collateral in 
regulations of the Government (McCarty & Leader, 2001). This strict regulation caused most of the 
households to fail to gain access to formal credit because currently, only 60 percent of total rural 
households have land use certificates (Hung 2005 cited in Phuong 2006).  
From the side of lenders, they have also faced difficulty in enforcing pledges and mortgages. There 
were not many cases where land has been liquidated in the event of a farmer’s default (Bao Duong & 
Izumida, 2002). Banks were not usually allowed to seize land from defaulting farmers, even if the use 
rights have been pledged. It is more or less impossible to evict farmers and auction their land because of 
the lack of legal infrastructure and assistance from local authorities (Wolz 1997 cited in Dufhues & 
Buchenrieder, 2005).  
Another problem related to management regime is that despite the policy of subsidized interest rate, 
which was promulgated by the Government, only targeted the poor households, many loans from the 
VBSP have gone to other groups. The case study in Ha Tay province is a typical example. Up to 70 
percent of the households in this study that got loans from VBSP were medium and better-off 
households. Whereas, only 20 percent of the households that obtained loans from public funds and 
projects are poor (Bali Swain et al., 2008a). This problem not only distorts the Government’s policy but 
may create negative social impact due to unpleasant reaction of the poor group. 
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In addition, most semiformal lenders lack of clear legal status, except CEP. They also have no 
detailed legal framework for operation. Thus, they have no authority to have relation with other 
organizations or access to the foreign capital markets or to mobilize public savings. As a result, it has 
prevented them from expanding operations. Taking the Microfinance Loan Fund component in the 
World Bank’s Rural Finance Program as an example: With budget around 24 million USD, this fund 
dedicated to lending to eligible microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the form of refinancing loan 
portfolios. However, this component has not been disbursed in years because there was no real MFI in 
Vietnam (Chi, 2004).  
Furthermore, the credit programs supported by external organizations have usually been 
implemented within short periods, so they have faced difficulties in maintaining as well as developing 
credit activities in long-term direction and plan with available conditions of communities who take 
over the programs. Responsibility for operating the micro credit programs has usually been local people 
who come from the social political organizations and were not specialized on finance, therefore their 
capacities in managing and running operations have been limited.  
Finally, some formal institutions have still maintained complicated and time-consuming procedures, 
creating high transaction costs in household lending (Le 2003 cited in Pham & Lensink, 2007).  
How the state of rural finance and its challenges are revealed in the study site and how it impact on 
the segmentation of credit market will continue to be discussed in chapter 5 after learning about the 
research methodology and background of study site. 
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4 METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND OF STUDY SITE 
4.1 Conceptual framework and Basic concepts 
Rural credit market comprises a lot of rural borrowers as well as rural lenders. The rural borrowers 
belong to three groups of households: agricultural households, mixed households, and non-farm 
households. These groups are different in social network, physical and human capital, and income 
generating activities. From lenders side, formal, semi formal and informal credit sector are 
simultaneously in existence in rural market. They also have the distinct characteristics in regulations, 
financial capacity, and aims of operations. The credit transactions between lenders and borrowers, who 
have the separate features, create the different credit segment by interest rate, size, duration and purpose 
of loan.  
This research emphasizes income generating activities from borrowers’ side and regulations from 
lenders’ side among their characteristics to explain the segmentation of rural credit market in Phu 
Thuong commune. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Framework for analysis 
 
There are many different concepts and definitions from different authors for a certain terminology. 
In this study, the basic concepts and terminologies are used with following meanings:  
Rural credit market is the market in rural areas, in which lenders and borrowers contact each other 
for selling and buying credit. In that light, rural areas are large and often isolated areas of a country, 
sometimes with low population density. According to Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP), rural 
areas consists: of communes and towns that belong to districts and communes belonging to towns or 
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cities (district’s counterpart in administrative function that belong to provinces) (Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policy, 2009). 
Formal sector is regarded as the sector in which loan transactions are “bound by the legal regulations 
of a country” (Ellis, 1992), and is controlled directly by the State Bank. It includes banks, credit 
cooperative institutions, and other registered financial institutions. 
With semi-formal sector, it provides loans to “selective range of borrowers” and “conforms to 
certain development targets” (Pham & Lensink, 2007). Its operation is allowed by local authorities but 
not monitored directly by the State Bank. It operated under the management of local social political 
unions and budget supports from non-government organizations (NGOs). 
Informal sector is “not regulated by public authorities, and the terms and conditions attached to each 
loan are personalized, therefore vary according to the bargaining power of borrowers and lenders in 
each case” (Ramachandran & Swaminathan, 2001) and transactions in the informal sector do not lean 
on formal contractual obligations enforced through a codified legal system (Ayyagari et al., 2008). It 
refers to the financial services supplied by moneylenders such as rich farmers, traders and others in the 
rural economy who lend money on the basis of personal knowledge of each transaction (Ellis, 1992).  
Agricultural households are households who base mainly on farm and livestock husbandry for their 
income; mixed households earn money partly from farm, livestock husbandry and the rest from non 
farm activities such as small trade, handicraft, seasonal worker, jobs that getting regular salary every 
month; whereas non farm households are ones that get income principally from small trade, handicraft, 
seasonal work. The last group has occupied the biggest portion of total households in the study area.  
4.2 Research methodology 
Both quantitative and qualitative approaches were used in the research. While quantitative refers to 
counts and measures of things, qualitative research refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, 
characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of things (Bruce 2001 cited in Tuan, 2006). 
Quantitative approach to measure objective facts, focus on variables, value free, independent of context, 
many cases and subjects while qualitative style to construct social reality, cultural meaning, focus on 
interactive processes and event, values are present and explicit, situationally constrained and few cases 
and subjects (Neuman 2003 cited in Britha Mikkelsen, 2005). Quantitative approach finds out the 
numbers or figures as evidences to prove the arguments or interpretations from qualitative results. 
Conversely, qualitative method scrutinizes deeply on the numbers from quantitative outcomes to 
identify the reasons and the essence of objectives.    
In the thesis, quantitative method aims at looking for figures related to characteristics of credit 
market in general, features of the different credit sectors as well as the different groups of borrowers. 
Regarding general characteristics of credit market, this method focused on number of credit sources, 
total volume of credit, average interest rate, number of borrowers, average duration of loan, average 
size of loan. With feature of credit sector, quantitative method was used to identify the differences in 
their participations in rural credit market in term of size, duration, interest rate and number of loan that 
they applied to the different borrower groups. Relating to groups of borrower, the method was used to 
determin the size, duration, interest rate and number of loan that they received from the different credit 
sectors as well as other figures related to labour and economic status of households. These figures 
expressed both relative value and absolute value and were formulated comparatively among credit 
sectors as well as among groups of borrowers. Moreover, specific figures were considered in 
relationship with whole sample’s. Majority of data which were used for quantitative analysis were 
synthesized from secondary sources and household survey.  
Qualitative method expressed the concepts and perspectives about rural credit market, the process, 
procedure and obstructions in access to credit from the different lenders. These issues were mentioned 
for each group of borrower. Moreover, the qualitative approach helped making clear about the way to 
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organize and operate credit groups. More important, this method was used to investigat the reasons and 
conditions leading the different borrowers to prefer given credit sources but not others when they have 
demand. In addition, some special cases of lenders and borrowers’ behaviors were listed through 
qualitative analysis. Data were used for qualitative analysis getting mainly from group discussions and in 
depth interview. 
4.3 Data collection 
4.3.1 Secondary data collection 
Secondary data were collected and synthesized from several sources in both communal and 
provincial level. Statistical data on social economic status, state of using land, and the orientation and 
plan for development of the commune were taken from official annual reports. The information related 
to credit transactions such as borrowers, outstanding loans, interest rate, loan duration, etc,. were gained 
from reports of Women Union, VBARD (Cho Mai branch), VBSP (branch in Phu Vang district) and 
TYM fund. In addition, legal documents of lenders will provide regulations or rules of different 
financial institutions in term of subjects or beneficiaries, procedures, lending process, collateral regime. 
Data gathered from secondary sources are fundamental basis contributing for establishing and adjusting 
appropriately the next steps in the research. 
4.3.2 Primary data collection  
Primary data were collected from meeting with key local authorities, key informant interviews, 
group discussions, household surveys and observations. 
Key local authorities’ discussion 
Key local authorities were chosen including the representative of Commune People’s Committee, 
the Head of Woman Union and the Administrative staff of the commune and Heads of villages. The 
aim of these meetings is to get overall point of view as well as background information of the 
commune in term of natural resources, income generating activities, social economic context of study 
site, role of communal authorities in credit transactions, strategy for developing in the future and credit 
market status in Phu Thuong commune. The results of these meetings are essential foundation for 
implementing the next steps in study. 
Borrowing group discussions  
Three groups were selected randomly by author based on the borrower list that was provided by 
local authorities. Each group has from 10 to 12 people represented the different groups in income 
generating activities. The first borrower group includes the farmers who base mainly on agriculture - 
which was regarded as agricultural household group, the second group combines the households who 
rely on non farm activities such as the small trade, traditional handicraft jobs - which was recorded as 
non farm household group. The last one is group of households that are multiform in income from 
agriculture, small trading, handicraft occupations to wages - which can be called as mixed household 
group. The idea for choosing groups by income generating activities is based on assumption that the 
different households in income sources will have the different behaviour in getting credit.   
These discussions aim to gather information related to i) the major lenders in Phu Thuong 
commune; ii) the characteristics of lenders and borrowers in rural credit market; iii) regulation issues of 
each credit sector for obtaining a loan; iv) purposes of using loans; v) reasons why borrowers choose 
given sources to ask loans; vi) difficulties households face to when asking for credit; vii) the factors 
influencing on supporting households to obtain credit as well as viii) the expected loan’s characteristics 
that are suitable to them. 
Tools were used for these group discussions including seasonal calendar, ranking, drawing chart, 
Venn diagram. The borrower characteristics of income generating activities such as what they do, when 
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they start, when they harvest, what periods they need labors, capital and so on were expressed through 
seasonal calendar. With this tool the author can see the flow of costs and revenues as well as the periods 
of leisure and busy time around year. By facilitating of researcher, the reasons for their behaviors in 
obtaining credit, the obstacles for asking loans as well as characteristics of main lenders will be listed. 
Then ranking tool will tell us what reasons are most important, what constraints are major in access to 
credit. Drawing pie chart is necessary to understand how they use loans, structure of loan purposes. The 
organizations or individuals that effect on borrowing of households and the influence levels of each 
factor will be classified by Venn diagram.  
Non borrowing group discussion  
For non borrowers group, the discussion focus on i) the social economic characteristics of group, ii) 
the reasons why they do not obtain credit and iii) their expectations in access to credit. 
Seasonal calendar, ranking tools were used for this discussion. As above, with seasonal calendar, 
income generating activities of non borrowers will be shown. The difficulties or reasons they do not get 
loans will be revealed by the questions for matrix ranking. In addition, scoring these answers will 
expose the main issues of them in access to credit. 
Lenders group discussion  
Using information from key local authorities meetings and borrower group discussions, the group of 
lenders was determined. They are bank staff (VBARD and VBSP), manager of TYM fund, Head of 
Woman Union, one representative of ROSCAs and two representatives of goods suppliers who sell 
goods on credit to local people. 
The objectives of this discussion are to find out i) the characteristics of lenders and major group of 
borrowers in rural credit market; ii) the pattern of lending in rural areas; iii) the institutional or 
regulation issues for obtaining a loan; iv) obstacles in outreach clients in rural areas; and v) target groups 
as well as priority using purposes in lending development strategies of the different lenders.  
Some techniques were used to explore information in this discussion, for example, drawing diagram 
and chart to display the differences and similarities among credit providers in term of lending process, 
interest rate, loan term, and loan size. Seasonal calendar for lending activities was used to see when and 
for what using purposes they disburse capital for during the year, and how it is matched with borrower 
demands. Moreover, scoring tool was applied to determine the main constraints for expanding the 
credit market in rural areas.  
Key informant interviews  
Three key informants were selected from people who are well-informed about rural credit market 
in the commune. Semi structured interview technique with check-lists was conducted to get 
information. These interviews intend to confirm information gathered from the previous discussions 
and meetings, and also supplement missing data.  
Household survey 
45 households were selected randomly from the borrower list providing by local authorities. The 
result of selecting was 7 agricultural households, 26 non farm households and 12 mixed households. 
Questionnaires were used for the survey. The purposes of household survey were to assemble detail 
information of the different borrowers for understanding deeply about their characteristics and their 
behaviors in access to credit. Content of questionnaire covers a broad range from household’s 
characteristics of income sources, assets, land, education levels, households size, number of labors, types 
of social networks such as mass organizations, interest groups in production, ROSCAs that household 
participate in, to household’s behaviors related to credit access like sources or sectors that household get 
credit from, characteristics of given loans that household applied, procedures and conditions for 
obtaining loans from the different lenders, difficulties that household face to when asking credit, and 
purposes of using loans. In addition, the influencing factors on making decisions of household in credit 
transactions were mentioned.   
Household in-depth interviews 
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Three different households who come from the different groups (pure agricultural households, non 
farm households, and mixed households) were chosen randomly to conduct in-depth interview. The 
purposes of these interviews are to understand deeply the contexts and explanations for participation in 
credit market as well as their choices of lenders. Check lists with open-ended questions were used to 
get information from these households. 
Observations 
Observations were implemented during field work period. This technique is important to add 
missing data from the previous methods due to the hiding information as well as exceeding the 
knowledge of interviewees. Using observations can help researcher affirm information providing by 
local people. Moreover, results from this technique can suggest to the researcher the suitable ways to 
facilitate for interviewing as well as discussing.   
4.4 Data analysis 
Secondary data were analyzed first to get overall information for primary data collection. During 
field work, gathered information from observations, key informant interviews, discussions were taken 
note and classified every day. Results from household survey were coded and processed by Excel 
Microsoft software. 
The information were classified and organized into the different topics, including background of 
study site information; general information of rural credit market in Vietnam; structure of credit 
market; lenders - borrowers characteristics; regulation issues of credit transactions; obstacles of accessing 
to credit; features of segmented credit market in term of size, interest rate, duration, as well as using 
purposes.  
Collected data were analyzed and synthesized in the form of descriptive statistics by tables, charts, 
figures and diagrams to support for arguments and conclusions in chapter 4 and chapter 5. The numbers 
in analyzing were organized in form of both overall and means of data. Moreover, data were arranged 
in both the different household groups and whole sample. Some special cases of qualitative data were 
organized by boxes.  
4.5 Site selection and research process 
The research was carried out in Phu Thuong commune, Phu Vang district, Thua Thien Hue 
province. The study site was selected based on the following criteria: i) belong to rural areas; ii) 
diversified in finance sources (both formal, semiformal and informal sectors; and iii) diversified in 
income generating activities.  
Before making decision on the research site selection, the pre-survey was conducted by visiting the 
field and talking with local people to get overall picture in comparison with the predetermined criteria. 
After research site was identified, the discussion with key local authorities was implemented to gather 
background information of the commune, which were foundation for the next steps. Then, group 
discussions, key informant interviews, household surveys and observations were deployed to assemble 
data in a broad range from socio-economic conditions, in general, to credit market, in particular, in the 
study site. Next, secondary data and primary data, which were gained from field work, was synthesized 
and analyzed for writing thesis. 
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Figure 4.2: Site selection and Research process 
4.6 Background of study site 
4.6.1 General information  
Thua Thien Hue is located in the Central Region of Viet Nam. The Gross Domestic Product per 
capita in Thua Thien Hue province was 1,003 USD/person in 2009 (Thua Thien Hue People 
Committee, 2009). According to the Decision No. 86/2009/QD-TTg dated June 17th, 2009 by the 
Prime Minister, the economic structure is expected as follows: 45.9% from service industry sector, 
42.0% from industry and construction, and 12.1% agriculture, forestry, and fishery by 2010. With about 
1 million people and 5009 km2 area of natural land, Thua Thien Hue is divided into nine administrative 
units, Phu Vang district is one of them.  
Phu Vang is a coastal lowland district. Similar to other areas in Central Vietnam, Phu Vang belongs 
to monsoon tropical region with dry and rain seasons. Topography was partitioned by river and lagoon 
system. Natural area of Phu Vang district is 28,031 ha in which 10,829.44 ha for agriculture and about 
6,800 ha water surface of lagoon. Most of the population belong Kinh ethnic group and they are quite 
congregate in living. In 2009, the population density of Phu Vang was 647 people/km2, standing the 
second place in comparison with other districts and city in Thua Thien Hue province (Phu Vang 
People Committee, 2009). The district has a policy for the reviving and development of traditional 
handicraft jobs such as processing fishery-agricultural products, art carpentry, tailoring and 
embroidering.  
Phu Thuong is one of 20 communes of Phu Vang district, about 15 km on the West-North far 
from the district centre. According to local authorities, the commune was established in the early half of 
the nineteenth century under the Reign of Nguyen Kings. Hence, there are many big family clans with 
close mutual relationship for a long time in the commune, especially in financial connections. Beside 
the diversity of income generating activities such as farming, construction services, small trading and 
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tourism, several traditional jobs are still well-known at present such as food services (Nam Pho rice 
noodles), bricklayers or carpenters .  
 
 
 
  
                                    
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
Figure 4.3: Location of the study site in Vietnam 
4.6.2 Natural and  Physical conditions 
Total 587.5 ha of natural land area in Phu Thuong belongs to lowland area. The commune 
is circled by Huong river and Nhu Y river in the West and the South so it is convenient for waterway 
transportation, exploiting materials for construction and providing water for farming and raising 
poultry. With position nearby Hue city and Thuan An beach, and crossing of National Road No. 49, 
the commune also has advantages in transportation, exchange of goods, as well as developing small 
trade, tourism services and commerce. These characteristics contribute to the diversified development 
of income generating activities, thus, it effects more or less on credit demand of households. 
4.6.3 Social-economic situation  
Phu Thuong commune is a crowded population commune in Phu Vang district. Population density 
in this commune was 2291 people/km2 (in 2009), much more higher than that in Phu Vang district. 
Poverty rate of the commune is low, only 2.02% of total households are poor.  
The economic structure of Phu Thuong includes commerce and service, craft industry, and 
agriculture. Contributions of these sectors in communal GDP were approximately 64%, 25%, and 11%, 
respectively (source: Local authorities meeting).  
The main activities in trade and service sector were foods services, transportation, resident and 
relaxing services, and selling materials for construction. The traditional jobs in Phu Thuong commune 
included making traditional hats, cooking rice noodles (well-known with Nam Pho rice noodles), 
carpentry, making traditional incense. Besides, making brooms and leather shoes, tailoring, doing 
construction were also activities involving significant number of labours. Due to rapid urbanization, 
Phu Thuong Commune Vietnam 
Phu Vang 
District Thua Thien 
Hue Provice 
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land for agriculture was narrowed so contributing of this sector also has decreased over time. Rice and 
cash crop were main plants in farms of local people. Livestock, buffaloes, pigs, poultries were raised 
with small scale. There are only 4 households investing at medium scale with size of more than 30 
heads of pig per farmhouse (Phu Thuong People Committee, 2009). 
Table 4.1: Some common social-economic characteristics in Phu Thuong commune 
Items Unit Value/Amount
Total natural land area Ha 587.5 
Population Person 13,461 
Total of households Household 3,262 
Number of poor households (183 people) Household 66 
Rate of poor households % 2.02 
Policy households Household 81 
Paddy area Ha 149 
Rice productivity Ton/ha/year 12.1 
Total cereal amount  Ton 1,832 
Number of Buffalo Head  126 
Number of Pig Head 1,100 
Number of Poultry Head 22,545 
Source: Phu Thuong People Committee (2009) Annual Social-Economic Report 
The development of commerce and service industry is not only expressed by their portion of 
communal GDP but also revealed by number of enterprises and households participating. In 2009, the 
commune had about 652 small and medium enterprises operating on trade and service industry sector. 
Craft industry sector was also developed with 208 enterprises. More than two third of households in 
Phu Thuong commune relied on non farm activities for their income. The number of pure agricultural 
households was only about 324, equivalent to 10% of total households. In addition, a mixed group 
carried out simultaneous agricultural and non farm activities, occupying about 23% of total. 
Table 4.2: Roles of economic sectors in Phu Thuong commune 
Items Unit Value/Amount** 
Contribution of commerce and service sector in communal 
GDP(*)  
% 64 
Contribution of craft industrial sector in communal GDP(*)  % 25 
Contribution of agricultural sector in communal GDP(*)  % 11 
Number of Service industrial, commercial enterprises Enterprise 652 
Number of Small and medium handicraft  enterprises  Enterprise 208 
Number of Pure agricultural households Household 324 (9.93) 
Number of Non farm households Household 2,180  (66.83)
Number of Mixed households Household 758  (23.24) 
Source: Phu Thuong People Committee (2009) Annual Social-Economic Report 
(*) Calculated by author based on information of local authorities meeting 
(**) Numbers in parentheses are percentage in total households 
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Workforce in the commune is quite abundant with 6506 people. Most of them has job in the 
commune or adjacent areas. Insignificant minority of Phu Thuong people goes overseas for getting jobs 
(6 cases in 2009). Less than 3% of labour force is unemployed.  
The participation of labours in economic sectors is similar to the pattern of enterprises and 
households. Labours in commercial, tourism, service industries, traditional handicraft and other non 
farm activities occupy the highest proportion, with nearly 70% of total labours. Group of agricultural 
labours and mixed labours who carry out both farm and non farm activities hold much less proportion 
with 10.05% and 17.63% of labour force, respectively. 
Table 4.3: Labours’ structure by income generating activities in Phu Thuong commune 
Items Amount % 
Total of labors 6,505 100 
Number of the unemployed 173 2.659 
Non farm labors 4,531 69.65 
Agricultural labors 654 10.05 
Mixed labors 1,147 17.63 
Source: Calculated by author from Phu Thuong People Committee (2009) Annual Social-Economic Report 
At present, the cooperative model still exists in the commune. Phu Thuong Agricultural 
Cooperative provides input materials and ploughing service for production of more than 600 members. 
These goods and services were usually supplied on credit. Members of cooperative have to pay after 
harvest time. In addition, the cooperative has supported from 50 to 60% credit capital for its members 
who want to expand production scale as well as practice new handicraft jobs (Thua Thien Hue 
Cooperative Union, 2009a).  
Results from group discussions showed that, beside Phu Thuong Agricultural Cooperative, there 
were some other providers serving local people with credit. In formal sector, VBARD and VBSP are 
two major lenders. In semi formal sector, TYM Fund reveals as an important provider. ROSCAs and 
shopkeepers are many other alternatives in informal sector for borrowers.  
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5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
5.1 Credit sectors in Phu Thuong Commune 
The credit market in Phu Thuong commune was recorded with the operations of both formal, semi 
formal and informal sector. These three credit sectors simultaneously existed in this commune. In each 
sector there were many different lenders. Though undertaking the same responsibility in financial field 
of rural areas, the different sectors have been specified by particular characteristics. Table 5.1 and table 
5.2 provide information relating to main lenders as well as their features in the commune market. 
Formal sector was the banks which run following the financial laws from the State and was 
controlled by the Central State Bank. The providers belonging to this sector were professional lenders 
in credit market. Most formal lenders were commercial organizations that operate for profit. Only 
VBSP was non-profit institution in banking system.  
Semi formal sector included organizations which were admitted by the authorities in community. 
Their lending was not professional but as an extra function that supported their main responsibilities. 
The lending in semi formal sector was undertaken by mass organizations or International Non 
Government Organizations (INGOs) through projects or programs. 
Informal sector was not officially recognized by law documents or by the authorities. Lenders in this 
sector might be individuals or group of people. Their operations were not shown publicly, even some 
of them were illegal. 
Table 5.1: Main lenders in Phu Thuong credit market by sectors 
Formal sector Semi formal sector Informal sector 
VBSP 
VBARD 
Sacombank 
TYM Fund 
Phu Thuong Agricultural Cooperative  
ROSCAs 
Shopkeepers*  
Moneylenders 
Relatives and friends 
Source: Group discussions, household survey, 2009 
(*) including people and enterprises who provide credit in kind such as foods, agricultural input materials, 
building materials 
From table 5.1, we can see that representing for formal credit sector in Phu Thuong commune were 
VBSP, VBARD and Sacombank (a commercial bank). In there, VBSP and VBARD were main 
lenders, Sacombank has just been established here and occupied only small share in the market.  
With about 937 borrower households and more than 9 billion VND loans outstanding (source: 
VBSP lending report, 2009), VBSP is the biggest lender in Phu Thuong commune for both aspects 
number of clients and total amount of credit. This bank has responsibility for providing credit to the 
poor and students. All loans from VBSP were subsidized by the Government; therefore, the interest 
rate was lower in comparison with other bank systems. Lending in this bank was implemented through 
credit saving groups which were established by social political organizations in commune such as WU, 
FU and VU. These institutions have guaranteed for none-collateral loans of their members, hence, the 
bank has only considered the requirements for credit in the applicant list which was submitted by them. 
WU, FU and VU have played intermediate role in monitoring loan procedures and loan usage of 
borrowers, and collecting loan interest instead of the bank. Among of them, WU was the biggest 
partner of VBSP in the study site. Beside the supports of the local social political institutions, the bank 
has used the joint liability regime to enforce repayment upon borrowers. In this light, if one member 
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has a default loan, the whole group will be 
rejected in the next disbursements. Regarding 
to principal loans, VBSP has carried out 
directly disbursing transactions and collecting 
repayments in People’ Committee Office of 
the commune.  
VBARD is also big provider in the 
commune. Lending in this bank was deployed 
by two ways. The first was lending directly to 
clients. Loans through this channel required 
collateral and usually were big loans (over five 
million VND). The second lending method 
was implemented indirectly through credit 
groups which were established by social 
political organizations or by group of 
households and individuals. This way was 
applied to small amount and none-collateral 
loans. The lending management in this bank 
was similar to VBSP’s pattern, but one step 
shorter. VBARD has contacted directly to 
credit groups instead of social political 
organizations like VBSP’s method. Though 
operating in rural areas, VBARD is a 
commercial bank so the interest rate in this 
bank was equal to other commecial banks at 
about 1 to 1.2% per month. 
Semi formal credit sector in the commune 
includes TYM Fund and Phu Thuong Agricultural 
Cooperative (PTAC). In which, TYM Fund has provided 
credit in cash while the Cooperative has served both in 
kinds and in cash. However, total amount of credit that 
was provided by the Fund much bigger than that from the 
Cooperative. 
TYM Fund stands for "Tau Yeu May" in Vietnamese, 
means “I love you” in English. The fund has origin from 
a credit program of the Central Vietnam Women's Union 
(VWU). On January, 1992, Chairwomen of VWU signed 
Decision No.11/QD regarding implementation of TYM 
Fund Project, and one month later, the Government 
promulgated Document No.563/KTDN permitting 
VWU to carry out the project. The credit project was a 
replication of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. 
TYM Fund targets at women having low income, in 
the working age, having good health, volunteering to join 
and committing to executing TYM's regulations. The 
aims of TYM Fund is to improve the life quality and 
status of poor and poorest women and their families by 
providing groups of women in community with 
appropriate financial and non-financial services, offering 
them opportunities to participate in economic activities 
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and raising their role in society. By the end of the year 2009, TYM had 41 branches in 10 provinces 
and cities of Vietnam with more than 40 thousand members (TYM Fund, 2009). In Thua Thien Hue 
province, TYM Fund has operated in 4 communes and Phu Thuong commune was one of them.  
The TYM Fund in Phu Thuong commune established and started its operation since end of the 
year 1997 as a credit provider with credit an saving services in community (The health micro-insurance 
has serviced in other provinces of TYM Fund system but it has not appeared in Phu Thuong TYM 
Fund). Its members are women who come from Women Union of the commune. At present, this 
lender provides loans to 675 clients (its members also) in all 8 villages of the commune with total 
amount more than 2 billion VND. At present, loan size of TYM Fund is from 1 to 8 million VND. 
The Fund was organized into groups of 5 members. The managing regime of TYM Fund has based on 
joint liability among group members. Due to this mechanism, the rate of repayment was so high, up to 
100% of loans. Credit are disbursed every year relied on members’ requirement and agreement of other 
members. For loans at all size, borrowers have to return weekly instalments during 50 weeks. Every 
week, the group leaders collect fixed amounts of money including interest, a part of principal loan, 
saving money and a small amount for mutual helping fund from members.  
Another credit source in semi formal sector is PTAC. It is the social professional association in the 
commune with more than 630 members. The cooperative has provided agricultural services to their 
members and other clients in community such as ploughing fields, irrigating, supplying fertilizer, 
pesticide, training course on handicraft jobs. In some cases, this organization has served credit to the 
members who want to expand business and production scale (Thua Thien Hue Cooperative Union, 
2009b).  
The lenders belonging to formal sector such as VBARD, VBSP have provided credit only in cash to 
their customers whereas semi formal and informal have supplied credit both in cash and in kind. 
Furthermore, some semi formal and informal lenders have delivered credit with assistant services like 
PTAC with technique for raising livestock, cultivating rice, agricultural input sellers with using fertilizer 
or TYM with guideline for managing family finance. 
Informal credit sector has found varied kinds of lender, combining ROSCAs, moneylenders, 
shopkeepers, friends and relatives. 
ROSCAs is a traditional form in rural credit market. In this pattern, members are both lenders and 
borrowers. Members in a ROSCA are usually people who come from the similar situation of job, place 
for living, or who are relatives and friends. All ROSCAs members contribute regularly amount of 
money to common fund, and this fund will be sent each member in turn.  
The credit source from ROSCAs was popular in Phu Thuong commune. Most people taking part 
in ROSCAs have daily income. They give contribution every day, every week or every month. There 
are three kinds of ROSCAs in the commune. One disburses common fund every ten days, another one 
allocates the fund every fifteen days, and the last one give the fund every month. The order for getting 
the common fund was identified by biding, choosing randomly through lottery ticket, or negotiating 
among members. Number of members and amount of money contributing each time as well as 
delivering mechanism were varied. Number of people in a ROSCA was about five to twelve 
depending type of ROSCAs. Scale of contribution depends on economic condition of members, 
changes from ten thousand VND to more than hundred thousand VND per day or from hundred 
thousand VND to million VND per month. The popular level in sample households was from ten to 
fifty thousand VND per day. According to local people, the big ROSCAs which has amount of 
contribution per day bigger than fifty thousand VND were usually delivered to outsiders of group, thus, 
getting high risk, therefore, there were not many people joining these ROSCAs. 
Shopkeepers were found as lenders in the commune. They are input material providers for  
agricultural production or construction, and also small traders who owned a shop for selling foods and 
other consumption goods. These lenders usually supply credit in kind to acquaintance in community 
under form of selling goods on credit. The most popular of goods in these relation are foods, building 
materials, fertilizer and livestock feed. 
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Moneylenders are also credit providers in Phu Thuong commune. There are about four to six big 
moneylenders in the research site. They are rich people in community. Their lending operations were 
not showed publicly. The interest rate fo these lenders was recorded much higher than other providers, 
from 1.2 to 5% per month depending on lenders as well as borrowers. Nevertheless, this source is still a 
common alternative in urgent cases of local people. 
Relatives and friends are also sources for asking loans. The interest rate of these lenders is normally 
very low or even free of charge. However, data from field work have shown that local people rarely get 
credit from their relatives and friends. They have explained that because it was not many rich relatives 
and friends in rural areas so it was difficult to require for credit from them, unless in special cases.  
In short, it can be said there have been an existence and operation simultaneously of formal, semi 
formal and informal sector in credit market in Phu Thuong Commune. Within each sector, the lenders 
have been various, especially in informal sector.  
Beside the similarities in business place and responsibility in supplying loans to local clients, each 
lender has had particular characteristics in term of kind of credit products/services, scale and duration of 
credit, number of transactions, interest rate, loans purposes, as well as process of disbursing credit. 
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Table 5.2: Characteristics of main lenders in Phu Thuong Commune 
Items TYM 
Fund 
PTAC ROSCAs Shop-
keepers 
Money-
lenders 
VBARD VBSP 
Kinds of credit Cash Cash and 
kinds 
Cash Kinds Cash Cash Cash 
Default rate by total number of loans 
(%) 
0 0 2 - 3* 1- 2* ... 2 - 3* 3.02 
Default rate by total amount of loans 
(%) 
0 0 2 - 3* 1 - 2* ... 2 - 3* 1.80 
Average loan size (Million VND) 5 5 3 4 1 - 5* 10 - 12 7.792 
Interest rate (%/month) 1,815 1 0 - 1.5 1 -1.5* 1.2 - 5* 1 - 1.2 0.5 - 0.65 
Loan term (month) 12 (50 
weeks) 
6 3 - 12 Not 
defined 
Not 
defined 
12 - 60 12 - 72 
Principal loan Weekly  At the end of 
duration 
Daily, weekly 
or monthly 
Flexible  Flexible Every 6 months or 
every year or at the 
end of duration  
Every 6 months 
or every year  
Repayment 
schedule 
Interest  Weekly At the end of 
duration 
Daily, weekly 
or monthly 
Flexible Flexible Monthly or every 3 
months 
Monthly or every 
3 months 
Source: Compiled by author from VBSP lending report in 2009; TYM lending report in 2009 and Lenders group discussions 
(*) Estimated   (...): Facts occurred but no information 
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5.2 Differences among formal, semi formal and informal lenders   
The co-existence of formal, semi formal and informal credit sector in Phu Thuong commune was 
revealed by the operations of many lenders. Beside the similarities in business place and responsibility in 
supplying loans to local clients, each credit sector as well as each provider had many particular 
characteristics in term of kind of credit products/services, scale of credit, number of transactions as well 
as other characteristics of credit contracts and process of disbursing credit. 
Table 5.3: Characteristics of credit contracts by credit sectors  
 Formal sector Semi formal Informal 
Amount  52 46 76 Number of 
loans % 29.89 26.44 43.68 
Amount  486.3 268 340.1 Total  of 
credit (Mil. 
VND) % 44.44 24.49 31.08 
Mean 9.35 5.83 4.48 Loan size 
(Mil. VND) Sd  4.63 2.16 3.15 
Mean 0.877 1.730 1.617 Interest rate 
(%/month) Sd  0.287 0.300 1.111 
Mean 28.91 8.73 4.27 Loan term 
(month) Sd  12.72 1.43 4.31 
Collateral requirement  
No in VBSP  
No in VBARD (for loans under     
5 mil.VND) 
No in Sacombank (for clients have 
salary) 
Yes in VBARD (for loans over       
5 mil.VND) and Sacombanks (for 
clients have no salary) 
No No 
Sometimes 
yes in 
moneylenders
Purposes  
Production and education in VBSP  
Production in VBARD 
Production and consumption in  
Sacombanks 
Production and 
consumption in 
TYM 
Production in 
PTAC 
Production 
and 
consumption 
Waiting time for loan  1 day - 6 weeks 1 -2 weeks Within 1 day 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
Table 5.3 showed the characteristics of credit contracts by credit sectors. In which, the duration of 
loans in formal credit sector has been longer than that in the rest sectors. Nearly 29 months have been 
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loan term in average in formal providers while in semi formal and informal these figures were much 
shorter, about 9 months and 4 months, respectively. However, the remarkable point is the duration of 
loans from shopkeepers, relatives and friends were usually not defined clearly before borrowing.  
The bigger loans were also recorded in formal lenders with loan size up to 9.35 million VND. In 
contrast, semiformal and informal credit providers have lent much smaller than that in formal sector, 
with about 5.8  and 4.5 million VND per loan in average. 
The question outstanding here is why formal sector holding advantages in both size and term of 
loans. Results from discussions have suggested that it has related to capital capacity of lenders. VBARD 
and VBSP were both professional lenders therefore their scale of capital were much bigger than other 
ones in semi formal and informal sector. Due to that financial base the formal lenders could provide 
bigger loans in long term. This explanation is also matching with the empirical data from household 
survey where total amount of credit from formal sector has occupied more than 44% of total market. 
Semi formal and informal providers have kept in turn 24.49% and 31.08% of total credit volume. 
However, there has been the difference in order of the sectors by number of credit transactions. It has 
been displayed statistically that although informal sector has not distributed the biggest amount of loans 
in market but it has kept the first position in number of loans with 79 transactions equivalent to 44.63% 
of total whereas formal sector has only stayed the second place. 
Regarding to the interest rate, data from survey have shown that there has been the large gap 
between formal sector and two remainders. The interest rate among semi formal and informal lenders 
was recorded equal to each other, at level of 1.6% to 1.7% per month that about two times higher than 
that in formal lenders. This distinction can be interpreted by two main reasons. Firstly, this was an 
influence of the subsidized interest rate from VBSP on the average interest rate of the whole sector. 
Because VBSP’s interest rate was about two times lower than the average level of market, hence, when 
calculating this figure in average for whole sector, the result would be low. Secondly, moneylenders 
usually have allocated credit at very high interest rate, therefore, it has raised the average level of 
interest rate of whole informal lender group. These two contrasting trends have expanded the gap 
between formal and informal credit sector.  According to a staff of TYM Fund, the interest rate is only 
1% per month but the authour’s calculations, based on her data, revealed that the real interest rate is 
1,815% per month. The reason of this disparity was explained by weekly repayment method that TYM 
has applied to its borrowers. The TYM Fund staff has ignored the fact that the principal loan has 
reduced every week, hence, her result on interest rate was smaller than that in reality. 
The way to take back the loans was diverse among the different sectors as well as among credit 
providers. Repayment of loans included two parts. One part is principal loan and another one is interest 
of loan. The most flexible repayment schedule has belonged to informal sector. The informal lenders 
have not separated principal loan from interest of loan. They have often combined the interest of loan 
in prices of goods or in regular instalments. That is why some borrowers had not answered exactly 
interest rate of their debts. Two in three lenders of this sector have not fixed repayment time to their 
clients. These were shopkeepers and moneylenders. For ROSCAs, they have determined time for 
repaying daily, weekly or monthly that depending on the type of ROSCAs and the number of people 
in group. Two lenders in semiformal sector also have not distinguished between the interest and 
principal loan. All loans from TYM Fund have to be repayed during 50 weeks. Every week borrowers 
have to return a given amount of money depending on their loan size. This amount of money has 
included not only the interest of loan and principal loan, but also amount of saving and small part for 
mutual helping fund which was used in cases of sickness or death of members. After every five years, 
the borrowers will get back their savings.   
In aspect of conditions and regulations for accessing credit, the differences among lenders were more 
obvious in table 5.3 with a lot of particular characteristics in each credit provider. While the regulation 
on purposes for using loans was quite strict in major formal lenders, this rule in informal ones was very 
elastic. Most loans from VBSP and VBARD have been accepted only for production. VBSP also has 
serviced loans for education purpose according to the Government program. Whereas, all kinds of 
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informal lenders even have not cared for what purposes the loan was used for as long as their clients 
could repay loans with the given interest rate on time. Both TYM Fund and PTAC were semi formal 
lenders but TYM Fund has seemed more flexible than PTAC in loan using regulation. Borrowers 
could ask loans from TYM Fund for both consumption and production purposes while PTAC has only 
supported to investment purposes. Target group of VBSP and VBARD was poor or low income 
households but Sacombank - the other formal lender- has paid attention on group of people who get 
salary every month. VBSP, semi formal providers and ROSCAs have focused on their members only. 
Their clients have to be their members. While on the contrary, shopkeepers and moneylenders have 
agreed with almost any group of clients. 
To get loan with amount bigger than 5 million VND, VBARD’s clients have to give collaterals to 
secure for their loans. In case of Sacombank, if customers were not staffs of a certain organization, they 
also have to show collaterals. All remainders of loans, borrowers have used guarantee from mass 
organizations (TYM Fund, PTAC and VBSP cases) or their own prestige (moneylenders, shopkeepers 
and ROSCAs cases). In case of moneylenders, people could get loans without collaterals, however, the 
interest rate would be lower if they give moneylenders the worth assets. People who want to obtain 
credit from VBSP have to satisfy the essential condition about borrower’s wealth status which was 
identified by local authorities. According to that condition, borrowers have to be a member of a poor 
household which is settled in the commune every year. Beside the common regulations, VBSP has 
required borrowers having at least one inheritor for repaying the debt in case the death of borrowers. 
The waiting time in VBSP was revealed longer than 6 weeks in some cases (see table 5.3) due to 
economic crisis or tight cash supply policy from Government to avoid inflation (during 2008 - 2009). 
Some cases even VBSP has used amount of repayment cash which just collected from borrowers to 
disburse immediately to other clients, so if there are many default borrowers, the time for waiting of 
new customers will expand. A leader of VBSP saving credit group has explained: “In this period, the 
bank prioritizes clients who get loans for education purpose because the bank seems to lack of cash 
temporarily. People who require loans for other purposes have to wait till the next time”. 
Related to mechanisms to monitor clients and manage loans, some loaners have relied on peer 
pressure among members such as TYM Fund, VBSP, ROSCAs, while others have based on the 
financial laws in general like VBARD, Sacombank or the interventions from local authorities in case of 
PTAC, or leaned on themselves such as moneylenders, shopkeepers. Those mechanisms have not 
influenced similarly on repayment rate, however, they have contributed significantly to control this rate 
under 4% of both number and amount of loans (see table 5.2). 
Another difference among lenders was the process of allocating credit. Data from household survey 
and group discussions have confirmed this process was really varied in rural credit market. Unlike most 
loans from other providers that were delivered directly, VBSP and TYM Fund has supplied capital with 
assistances of intermediates. Formal loaners have to complete legal procedures before disbursment, thus, 
the period of waiting for loans in formal sector in general was longer than that in other sectors, except 
Sacombank case. The procedures for getting credit from formal lenders were also recorded more 
complicated, in comparison with other ones, especially in case of VBSP. While no idea of complicating 
in semiformal and informal credit sector, VBSP was reflected as a lender with the most complicated 
loan procedures (see table 5.4).  
 
 
 
Table 5.4:  Commenting of households on loan procedures in different lenders (% of sample household 
agree with) 
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Lenders Complicated Normal Simple No ideas* 
VBARD 4.40 53.38 31.11 11.11 
VBSP 40.00 20.00 35.56 4.44 
Other commercial banks 0.00 0.00 8.89 91.11 
TYM Fund 0.00 37.77 55.56 6.67 
Moneylenders and 
shopkeepers 
0.00 35.55 48.89 15.56 
Relatives and friends 0.00 86.67 13.33 0.00 
ROSCAs 0.00 60.00 17.78 22.22 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
(*) Some households have not obtain credit from or not sure about the given lenders so they have no ideas 
In summary, the differences among three credit sectors are clearly in aspects of credit contract terms, 
managing mechanism, conditions and regulations as well as process for getting credit. The duration of 
loans in formal credit sector has been longer than that in the rest sectors in average. Formal sector has 
stood at the first place in term of total credit volume while informal sector has kept the first position in 
number of loans and the flexible repayment schedule. With respect to the interest rate, there has been 
the large gap between formal sector and two remainders, in which, this figure in formal lenders has 
been about a half of that in semiformal and informal lenders. Conditions and regulations for getting 
credit are extremely different among lenders. While these rules were quite strict in major formal 
lenders, they were very elastic in informal ones. The process of allocating credit in formal sector has 
been recorded most complicated, in comparison with other ones. 
5.3 Non borrowing group characteristics 
From aspect of participation in credit market, households can be divided into borrowing group and 
non borrowing group. Relating to this respect, McCarty and Leader (2001), in a research conducted in 
Vietnam, found out that microfinance market in Vietnam was segmented into those who can access 
VBARD and those who cannot. These authors emphasized that the poor were mostly excluded from 
the attractive formal market of the VBARD (McCarty & Leader, 2001).  
To look at this aspect of segmentation in study site, besides collecting data from borrower group, we 
gathered information of non borrowing households through a group discussion. Results from the 
discussion revealed two main groups of non borrowing people, including group of no demand 
households and group of households who want to get loan, mainly from formal credit sector, but have 
obstacles. The particular characteristics of each group have suggested explanation for this segmentation.  
For no demand group, no investment needs and sufficient capital by themselves have been the 
reasons that they had raised for not borrowing. The households who are elderly, have no workforce or 
handicapped ones have not invested in any production activities, hence, they have said no with credit. 
Some households have expressed that they had not obtain loan because they can serve capital by 
themselves. These households normally are better off households. 
With impeded group, there have been many answers for the question why they did not get loan. 
First of all, lack of collaterals has been main reason for households who want to ask credit from 
 -  - 44
VBARD and other commercial banks. These households have not the “red book” for their land or 
they are very poor without valuable assets to give the banks as collaterals.  
Secondly, some households lack of information on credit market. They had not known where and 
how to get loans. This group includes households who do not have close relationships with 
communities and local authorities who participated in process of delivering credit, or are not members 
of social political organizations, thus, they have not gained any information related to borrowing 
alternatives.  
Table 5.5: Clients characteristics and reasons for not borrowing 
 Reasons   Features  
No investment needs Elders, no labor forces or handicapped No 
demand 
groups Sufficient capital by 
themselves  
Better off households  
Lack of collaterals Land without the “red book”* or/and poor households 
Lack of credit market 
information; 
 
No close relationship with communities and local 
authorities who participated in process of delivering 
credit; or No participatory in social political 
organizations 
No prestige; Afraid 
of debts 
Bad debts history or Very poor 
Not belong target 
group of lenders 
 
Better off, government salary households or; 
No close relationship with local authorities who 
participated in process of delivering credit; or/and Not 
fulfill  paying tax and other duties regulated by local 
government; or/and No participatory in social political 
organizations; or/and Bad debts history 
Complicated 
procedures;   
Low level in schooling 
Impeded 
groups 
High interest, short 
duration 
Very poor agricultural households 
Source: Non borrower group discussion, 2009 
* Certificate of the right to using land in Vietnam 
Thirdly is the group of households who have been afraid of debts or without prestige so they have 
not dared to request credit. These households have been featured by very poor or have a bad debt 
history status.  
Next is common reason of people who have not belonged to target groups of lenders. If they are 
better off households, they will not be accepted for subsidized loans from VBSP or other supported 
programs which are aimed at the poor. In rural areas like the study site, households getting government 
salary have been considered as the wealthy, so these people have also had obstacles in access to cheap 
credit. Other credit sources such as TYM Fund, PTAC have targeted only at their members, therefore 
outsiders who have not participated in social political organizations such as Women Union, Agricultural 
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Cooperative have been excluded from these lenders. In addition, when households have not fulfilled 
paying tax and other duties regulated by local government, or/and they have a bad debts history status, 
the local authorities have not confirmed that they belong to the poor group, therefore, they have not 
received credit from the poor target programs. It is interesting to find out that, in some cases, even 
borrowers have not been a part of target group, but they have had close relationship with local 
authorities who participated in process of delivering credit, thus, they have been helped from local 
authorities to get loans. This situation has usually occurred with the pro poor credit program supplied 
by VBSP.  
Another reason has related to complicated procedures. Several households who are low level in 
schooling have met obstacles in satisfying the lenders’ requirement on procedures. They have not 
known how to make procedures with many documents, when and where to submit their loan 
applications. Hence, these households have been outsiders of credit programs. 
The last one is the reason from very poor agricultural households. These households have claimed 
that the loan terms have not been suitable with them. According to that, the interest rate was so high 
and the duration of loan was too short in comparison with their expectations. That is why they have 
not joined into credit market. 
The group of very poor households or/and have a bad debts history have also had difficulties to 
aquire loans from informal and semiformal sector. Most of lenders have not believed in their ability to 
repay the loans, hence, they have not dared to give this group credit. This may be one of the vital 
problems that makes this group cannot escape from poor and bad debt status.  
The rest of the impeded groups have accepted keeping the same production scale, lessening 
consumption expenses. At the time that the author conducted the study, the gained data had shown 
that they have tried to mobilize all owned capital that they can to pay for their demand. This group has 
also expressed that maybe in future they will obtain credit from a certain lender in informal sector as a 
supplement to satisfy their demand if conditions to get credit from formal source do not change. In this 
case, further research on how they respond to deal with the blocked situation in accessing to credit for 
long term is necessary.  
5.4 Characteristics of client groups in Phu Thuong Commune credit market  
The information from field work has revealed that there were three groups of households divided by 
income generating activities. The pattern of borrowing was influenced by the income generating 
pattern. They are agricultural households, mixed households, and non farm households.  
Table 5.5 showed that there was significant difference among three groups in average areas of land 
that each household owned. This figure was biggest in agricultural group and smallest in non farm 
group. Land area of the first and the second group was much larger than that in the third group, about 
five to six times. It seems that the households in the last group have chosen non farm jobs due to their 
disadvantage in land. 
Agricultural group was also the biggest in family size and number of labours with 5.57 people and 
2.86 people, respectively. The common traits of three groups was high ratio of dependent people. In 
which, the mixed households was group that has had the highest in dependent ration with nearly 55% 
of total people in household. This group has usually had three generations living together, thus, 
proportion of the old and children quite high. This point was also confirmed by the first position of the 
group in age of household head indicator. In general, the mean age of household head in non farm 
households was younger than that in two remainders. The majority of households belonging to the 
third group were nuclear families with two generation living together, the dependents were children 
only, hence, this group had the lowest in percentage of dependents. Due to the advantage in labour, 
the non farm group has received highest income in comparison with other groups. 
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Table 5.6: Characteristics of client by household group categories  
Total sample 
(n=45) 
Agricultural 
households 
(n= 7) 
Mixed households 
(n=12) 
Non farm 
households 
(n=26) 
 
Mean  sd Mean  sd Mean  sd Mean  sd 
Land areas (m2) 1,546 1,603 3,414 1,730 2,616 1,623 551 305 
Family size 4.78 1.65 5.57 3.36 4.25 0.62 4.81 1.27 
Number of 
labors* 
2.42 0.92 2.86 0.90 1.92 0.90 2.54 0.86 
Ratio of 
dependents (%) 
49.30 15.70 48.72 15.42 54.90 18.20 47.20 13.94 
Age of 
household head 
49.56 12.22 54.86 10.98 58.00 6.66 44.23 11.94 
Average number 
of loans 
3.87 1.37 4.14 0.90 3.83 0.83 3.81 1.33 
Average amount 
of credit 
24.32 6.89 17.47 5.06 23.58 6.44 24.77 5.98 
Total income 
(million VND) 
40.03 17.21 35.93 16.30 35.83 15.04 43.07 18.51 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
(*) Number of labors was counted for people who were healthy and from 18 to 60 with male, to 55 with female  
With respect to the participation of households in credit market, agricultural group has received the 
biggest number of loans, with 4.14 loans/household on average. However, this group has tended to 
obtain loan with small size, therefore, average amount of credit in agricultural households was the 
smallest. The othe two groups were quite similar to each other in number of loans and amount of 
credit that the households  had. In average, mixed group and non farm group have received about 3.8 
loans with amount of credit from 23 to 25 million VND per household. 
Regarding to schooling status of household head, data from survey were analyzed and presented in 
table 5.7. In general, the ratio of household head at secondary level in schooling was significant, with 
more than 42% of total. Especially, this rate was highest in agricultural group, up to 71.43%. Numbers 
of household head getting advance training on a certain job were not much in general, only 20% in 
total sample. However, this figure was not equal among groups. While no one of household heads in 
agricultural group was trained in advance level of occupation, this number in mixed group was 33.33%. 
This pattern might be explained by their income generating activities. Agricultural production seems a 
traditional job so the farmers can conduct without advance training. Instead of learning from training 
center, they have imitated their ancestors. With respect to official work of some household head in the 
second group, people have to get specific training courses for their works. That is why the portion of 
household head at advance training level was the highest among three groups.  
Table 5.7: Schooling status of household head by household groups and school levels (%) 
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 Total 
sample 
(n=45) 
Agricultural 
households 
(n= 7) 
Mixed households 
(n=12) 
Non farm 
households 
(n=26) 
Primary school 13.33 14.29 25.00 7.69 
Secondary school 42.22 71.43 25.00 42.31 
High school 24.44 14.29 16.67 30.77 
Advance training on a certain 
occupation 20.00 0.00 33.33 19.23 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
The results of household survey expressed that, beside the differences in land area, income and 
human capital, the different groups had particular features in amount of required credit and purposes for 
borrowing. Each group had specific social economic conditions. Their income generating activities 
have also not been similar to each other. Therefore, credit demand of them has been different. In the 
context of credit market in rural areas, the banking sector has often allocated loans with the same size, 
same duration, same interest rate to target groups. This has lead to the differences in satisfaction among 
household groups. 
The figures from table 5.8 expressed that, in general, the level of satisfaction in loan term has been 
higher than that in loan size. More than 77% of total households thought that the duration of loans that 
were provided by lenders has been suitable, whereas, for loan size, this figure has been only 60%. 
Among three groups, agricultural households have had the highest satisfaction in both loan size and 
loan term at level of 85.71%. Mixed group has seemed least fulfillment with both clauses on size and 
duration in credit contract. The last category had the largest difference in satisfaction between size and 
term in their loans. Almost 85% of households in this group have said that duration of loans which 
were provided by lenders had been suitable with their demands, while only 53.85% of them were 
pleased with the amount of credit that they had received. 
Table 5.8: Required credit in comparison with received loan in fact by household groups  
 Total 
sample 
(n=45) 
Agricultural 
households 
(n= 7) 
Mixed 
households 
(n=12) 
Non farm 
households 
(n=26) 
Ratio of households were 
satisfied loan size (%) 
60.00 85.71 58.33 53.85 
Ratio of households were 
satisfied loan term (%) 
77.78 85.71 58.33 84.62 
Households willing continue to 
obtain credit (%) 
91.11 85.71 91.67 92.31 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
Because of unsatisfied about loan size, almost all of sample households (91.11%) has expressed 
willingness to continue for obtaining credit in near future. Especially to VBSP - the lender has provided 
subsidized loans - this ratio has been highest, at level of nearly 100%. In comparison with other groups, 
the portion of agricultural households who want to get more credit has been the lowest, at 85.71%. 
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One household of this group has said that amount of received credit at the moment has been enough 
for his family’s demands and he has not dared to increase his debts for expanding scale of production 
due to potential risks. 
The different groups have not been the same in credit demand. Moreover, their loans have been 
used for many different purposes. The sample households have obtained credit to solve a series of 
investing demand, including farming, livestock husbandry, small trading and craft, building houses or 
buying commodities, paying old debts, spending for education, anniversaries, and buying foods. The 
differences of client groups in borrowing purposes were revealed in table 5.9. 
For total sample, number of household getting loans for foods and investing on small trade and crafts 
have occupied the biggest proportions, up to 55.56% of households. Education purpose has also held a 
significant rate with one third of total households. The remarkable purpose has been to pay for the 
previous debts. Though this purpose has kept less than 9% of total households but it has been an 
ominous sign for repayment because using loans for that purpose had meant the households could not 
get benefit which was usually expected for paying back. Furthermore, it has shown that the households 
have had many debts at the same time. 
In agricultural group, farming and foods purposes have taken the biggest ratio of households. 
Approximately 86% of households have gotten credit for foods purpose. This purpose has been 
recorded as credit in kind from shopkeepers. Agricultural households had the biggest size of family, so 
lack of cash to buy foods has temporarily occurred, especially before harvesting period. Anniversaries 
have occupied a considerable position in agricultural group and mixed group with 28.57% and 25% of 
households, respectively. In rural areas, people still keep more or less traditional life style, therefore, 
they value anniversaries. That is why some households have recorded obtaining credit for this purpose.  
Table 5.9: Percentage of sample households by borrowing purposes (%) 
Borrowing purposes Total sample Agricultural 
households 
(n= 7) 
Mixed 
households 
(n=12) 
Non farm 
households 
(n=26) 
Farming 22.22 57.14 50.00 0.00 
Livestock husbandry 17.78 28.57 33.33 7.69 
Trading and craft 55.56 14.29 50.00 69.23 
Paying old debts 8.89 28.57 8.333 3.85 
Education 33.33 28.57 16.67 42.31 
Anniversaries   13.33 28.57 25.00 3.85 
Building houses or 
buying commodities 22.22 14.29 16.67 26.92 
Foods 55.56 85.71 41.67 53.85 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
In mixed group, the major 
proportion of number of households has 
obtained loan for production purposes. 
A half of households in this group have 
used credit for farming, trading and craft 22.22
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while one third of them has asked loan for investing in livestock husbandry. Foods have been 
continued purpose that many households spending for in this group with more than 40% of 
households. 
Figure 5.1: Borrowing purposes 
No households of the non farm group have spent credit on farming. The ratio of non farm 
households getting loan for livestock husbandry has been insignificant, with only two households 
equivalent to 7.69%. This pattern can be explained by the poor situation on land areas of non farm 
households. These households owned small area of land, so instead of agricultural production, they have 
obtained loan for trading and investing on craft activities. Percentage of non farm households getting 
credit for trade and craft purposes have been revealed as highest position in comparison with other 
groups. 
As regard above, non farm families have been mentioned as nuclear families so ratio of children is 
quite high. It might lead to the non farm group to be the top of households who take credit for their 
children’s expenditure on education. 42.31% of non farm households have used credit for education 
purpose. Many households of this group have expressed that they spend money on schooling of their 
children with expectation that their children can get official jobs in future. Foods, together with 
education, have also been borrowing purpose of many households in non farm group. They have 
highlighted that because they did not conduct agricultural activities, thus, they were not self-sufficient 
of rice or vegetables. Therefore, these households have usually obtained credit in kind every month 
from food shops and repaid about one to three months later. 
In a concise manner, in terms of the participation of households in credit market, it can be divided 
into non borrowing and borrowing households. The early ones included no-demand households and 
impeded households. The reasons for not participating in credit market of non borrowing households 
are various, from immanent reasons of households to reasons coming from lender side. Among 
borrowing households, agricultural group has received credit with the biggest number of loan, 
however, this group has tended to obtain loan with small size, therefore the average amount of credit in 
agricultural households is the smallest. The two other groups were quite similar to each other in 
number of loans and amount of credit. Related to characteristics of client groups, all groups are 
recorded highly in dependent ratio. However, there are significant differences among borrower groups 
in household’s features and credit transaction characteristics. 
5.5 Segmented credit market  
In the previous sections, general characteristics of credit market as well as of lenders and borrowers 
have been discussed. This section will look deeply at the segmentation of market. How it is segmented, 
how behaviours of lenders and borrowers in segmented credit market are, what differences among 
credit sectors as well as borrowing groups are should be specified in this section. Data from households 
survey and group discussions were exploited to answer those questions. 
5.5.1 Segmented by loan size  
In respect of volume, credit market in Phu Thuong commune can be separated by amount of loan 
per household. From table 5.10, we can see that there were differences among three group of 
households in term of total credit. Agricultural households have obtained credit with the smallest 
amount in average, about 17.47 million VND per household. Mixed group and non farm group have 
been not much different in credit volume with around 24 million VND each household. These figures 
have agreed with results from group discussions when the participants had stated that credit demand of 
agricultural households is smaller than other groups. They have explained that because non farm 
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activities need more working capital in comparison with farm production, therefore farmers do not get 
more credit than traders or handicraftsmen do.  
The figures on table 5.10 expressed that, in general, sample households have received loans mainly 
from formal sector. Of which total 24.32 million per household, formal sources have occupied more 
than 44%, equivalent to 10.81 million VND while semi formal sources have shared the smallest portion 
with 24.5%. However, to each group of households, this pattern has not always been followed. Formal 
sector has kept the first position in group of agricultural households and group of mixed households 
with 50.7% and 59.37%, respectively,whereas, in non farm group, informal sector instead of formal 
sector held the biggest part in average amount of credit per household with 39.6%. This group, 
different from the remainders in structure of credit sources, has gotten loans from three sectors with not 
much disparity in proportion. Semi formal sector has in turn seized the end position in agricultural 
group and the second place in both mixed group and non farm group.  
Table 5.10: Average amount of credit per sample household by credit sectors and household groups * (million 
VND)  
Total sample 
(n=45) 
Agricultural 
households 
(n= 7) 
Mixed households 
(n=12) 
Non farm 
households 
(n=26) 
 
Mean Sd Mean Sd  Mean Sd  Mean Sd  
10.81 8.86  8.86  4.88 14 6.98 7.77 6.94 Formal 
sector 
(44.42)  (50.70)  (59.37)  (31.37)  
5.96 3.26 2.29 2.29 6.17 3.64 7.19 2.17 Semi formal 
sector (24.50)  (13.07)  (26.17)  (29.03)  
7.56 6.63 6.33 5.54 3.41 1.99 9.81 7.31 Informal 
sector (31.08)  (36.23)  (14.46)  (39.60)  
24.32 6.89 17.47 5.06 23.58 6.44 24.77 5.98 
Total 
(100)  (100)  (100)  (100)  
Source: Household survey, 2009 
(*) Numbers in parentheses are percentage figures 
The differences among three groups can be interpreted by particular features in income generating 
activities of each group. Agricultural production has the long time for capital turn over, so it needs 
loans with long duration. Moreover, the investment in this kind of production requires a big amount of 
capital but not regular. This request can be satisfied by formal lenders; hence, the first and the second 
group have mainly obtained credit from this sector. On the contrary, non farm activities need regular 
working capital and also have the shorter time for getting back capital. It means that people who 
conduct non farm activities will prefer credit sources which supply regularly with the shortest time for 
waiting loans. Since this reason, non farm group has looked for credit from all sectors and asked the 
most amount from informal lenders. 
 -  - 51
Looking from lender side through table 5.11, for total sample, loans have recorded the biggest size 
in formal credit sector and the smallest size in informal sector. This pattern has been confirmed in group 
of agricultural households and group of non farm households.  
All groups have received credit with biggest amount from formal lenders. The reason for these 
choices have interpreted simply that because the interest rate of formal loans are much lower than that 
in semi formal and informal sector, hence, people have tried to get as much as possible from formal 
credit sector. In addition, to satisfy specific credit demands of each borrower, they have sought more 
from other sources. 
Table 5.11: Average loan size by credit sector and household groups (million VND)  
Total sample 
(number of 
loans=174) 
Agricultural 
households 
(number of 
loans=29) 
Mixed 
households 
(number of 
loans=46) 
Non farm 
households 
(number of 
loans=99) 
 
Mean  Sd  Mean  Sd  Mean  Sd  Mean  Sd  
Formal credit 
(52 loans) 
9.35 4.63 6.89 2.85 8.84 3.96 8.42 3.69 
Semi formal 
credit (46 loans) 
5.83 2.16 2.29 1.38 6.17 1.75 6.93 1.47 
Informal credit 
(76 loans) 
4.48 3.15 3.41 1.34 2.72 0.61 5.31 3.63 
Total  6.29 4.02 7.19 2.65 6.15 3.76 6.60 3.42 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
(*) including people or enterprises who provide credit in kind such as foods, agricultural input materials, building 
materials 
The agricultural group has had the distinction of average loan size from semi formal lenders in 
comparison with other groups. In place of informal sector, farmers have obtained loans, with the 
smallest amount, from semi sector, at level of 2.29 million VND per loan. While this figure in the two 
rest groups has been much bigger, more than twice the agricultural households’ loan size in the same 
sector. This differential was caused by unfitting between the repayment schedule regulated by semi 
formal lenders and production traits of agricultural borrowers. TYM Fund, the major semi formal 
lender, has required weekly repayment. Of course, bigger loan size is also bigger in amount of weekly 
instalment. While, as regarding before, capital turn over period of agricultural production is quite long, 
thus, farmers have no regular income to fulfill instalments as regulation. Therefore, they have not dared 
getting, nor has the TYM Fund accepted offering a big loan. Conversely, the households who have 
non farm activities such as small trade usually get income by cash regularly every day. This character has 
been a strong foundation leading the two other groups to get loans from semi formal sector.  
With mixed households, they have only asked for small loan size, at level of 2.72 million per loan, 
from informal lenders. The question should be raise in here regarding why this group just gets small 
loans from informal sector. The answer for this question has been found out from group discussion and 
in depth interview results. According to those data, this group has both income sources, one from 
agriculture and another from non farm activities, hence, they can more or less be self-sufficient by their 
diversified income. Therefore, they have only gotten credit from informal providers in urgent cases to 
avoid high interest rate which had been mentioned like a character of informal loans.  
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Data from table 5.10 and table 5.11 indicated amount of credit per household as well as per loan. In 
this part, the discussion will focus more deeply on the segmentation of credit market into big size and 
small size. So, how many percent of transactions in each scale of loan are belong to a certain credit 
sector? How is different among three groups in share of loan transactions in each scale? These questions 
should be posed in this context.   
Table 5.12: Share of credit transactions by loan size and credit sector for total sample  
Formal sector Semiformal sector Informal sector Total market 
 
Number 
of loans % 
Number 
of loans % 
Number 
of loans % 
Number 
of loans % 
Number of 
loans up to      
5 mil. VND 
18 10.34 18 10.34 54 31.03 90 51.72 
Number of 
loans over       
5 mil. VND 
34 19.54 28 16.09 22 12.64 84 48.28 
Total 52 29.89 46 26.44 76 43.68 174 100 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
According to results from group discussions, clients can ask for loans without collaterals under group 
lending regime at level of 5 million VND from VBARD. In addition, based on group discussions, loans 
with amount over 5 million VND have been mentioned as big scale, otherwise, loans have been 
arranged in small scale. 
Figures in table 5.12 reveal that for total sample households, majority of transactions has come from 
informal sector. Number of loans from this sector have held 43.68% of total 174 loans. Formal and semi 
formal sector have kept the similar portion at 29.89% and 26.44% of total loans, respectively. These 
results reflect a feature in rural society where people are usually close in community relationship, thus, 
the mutual assistances among local people as well as the informal exchanges are very common. 
Therefore, quantity of informal transactions in credit market also keeps a major part. Moreover, the 
alternatives in formal credit sources are not much in rural areas in comparison with urban regions. Even 
though in case formal sources are available, rural people are not sure that they can obtain loans from 
there. These reasons have lead people go to informal lenders. 
In aspect of loan size, the loans have mainly belonged small scale. However, the disparity in ration 
between two scales has been slight. Number of loans up to 5 million VND has occupied 51.72%, 
whereas this number in loans over 5 million VND was 48.28% of total transactions. For small loans, 
transactions have been mainly implemented in informal sector with more than 31% of total loan, 
equivalent to 60% number of loans up to 5 million. For big scale, local people have asked from both 
formal, semi formal and informal lenders with not much difference in proportion. The biggest share 
have belonged to formal sector with 19.54% of total loans, it means approximately 40% number of loan 
over 5 million VND. Informal lenders have provided big loan with smallest portion, at 12.64% of total 
loans, equivalent 26% of loans in this scale. 
Table 5.13: Share of credit transactions by loan size and credit sector for agricultural households  
 Formal sector 
Semiformal 
sector Informal sector Total market 
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Number 
of loans % 
Number 
of loans % 
Number 
of loans % 
Number 
of loans % 
Loans up to 5 mil. 
VND 
5 17.24 7 24.14 11 37.93 23 79.31 
Loans over   5 mil. 
VND 
4 13.79 0 0.00 2 6.90 6 20.69 
Total  9 31.03 7 24.14 13 44.83 29 100.00 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
With agricultural households, figures in table 5.13 show that, situation of credit transactions have 
been the same as total sample’s. It means that a major part of transactions has come from informal sector 
and most loans have belonged to small scale. However, the level of these figures is different from those 
in total sample. 
Number of loans from informal sector have occupied nearly 45% of total 29 loans. Formal and semi 
formal sector have kept in turn about 31% and 24% of total loans. Agricultural households have 
explained that, since their income sources have only based on farm so it is not always they have enough 
money to buy goods that they need such as foods, fertilizer, seeds, pesticide, or feeds. Therefore, they 
usually get these goods on credit. And because these goods are only available at shopkeepers, so they 
have gone to that informal source for asking for this kind of credit. 
In term of loan size, there have been 23 of 29 loans, accounting for more than 79% of total loan, 
belonging to small scale. Almost a half of these loans have come from informal lenders. For loans over 5 
million VND, local people have received from both formal and informal lenders but mainly from 
formal sector (4 of 6 transactions). No loan at this scale has been gotten from semi formal providers. 
These figures can be demonstrated by looking at goods that agricultural households had bought and 
financial capacity of each sector. These households have often bought normal goods which are not high 
price and with small volume. In addition, financial capacity of formal lenders is much larger than that in 
informal ones. Therefore, most loans in agricultural group are not bigger than 5 million VND and 
borrowers have usually required small loans from informal sector but from formal sector for big loans.  
Table 5.14 provided information about loans of mixed households. Transactions of this group have 
some features similar to that in whole sample and agricultural group. Firstly, small loans have occupying 
majority with 54.35% of 46 loans and these transactions have been mainly carried out by informal 
lenders with three fifth of total 25 transactions. Secondly, people usually have received big loans from 
formal sector, at 28.26% of total, equivalent 60% of transactions in this scale. No loan over 5 million 
have been asked from informal lenders.  
The distinction character of this group is the biggest part of transactions has belonged to formal 
sector instead of informal sector. More than 41% of total transactions have been implemented by formal 
lenders in comparison with about 26% in semi formal sector and 33% in informal ones.  
Table 5.14: Share of credit transactions by loan size and credit sector for agricultural - none farm households  
Formal sector Semiformal sector Informal sector Total market 
 
Number 
of loans 
% Number 
of loans 
% Number 
of loans 
% Number 
of loans 
% 
Number of loans 
up to 5 mil. 
6 13.04 4 8.70 15 32.61 25 54.35 
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VND 
Number of loans 
over    5 mil. 
VND 
13 28.26 8 17.39 0 0 21 45.65 
Total 19 41.30 12 26.09 15 32.61 46 100.00
Source: Household survey, 2009 
For the last group - non farm households, the statistical figures on transactions by loan size express in 
table 5.15. The characters about credit transactions of this group have some points similar to that in 
whole sample and other groups. These are the majority of transactions belonging to informal sector, 
and this sector also being the main sources of loans with small scale. According to that, more than 48% 
of total transactions in non farm have occurred in informal sector, the rest of transactions has been 
shared between formal and semi formal lenders with 24.24% and 27,27% of total 99 loans. 
Table 5.15: Share of credit transactions by loan size and credit sector for none farm households 
Formal sector Semiformal sector Informal sector Total market 
 
Number 
of loans 
% Number 
of loans 
% Number 
of loans 
% Number 
of loans 
% 
Loans up to 5 mil. 
VND 
11 11.11 4 4.04 28 28.28 43 43.43 
Loans over 5 mil. 
VND 
13 13.13 23 23.23 20 20.20 56 56.57 
Total  24 24.24 27 27.27 48 48.48 99 100 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
The different trait here is instead of small loans, big scale of loans have occupied majority in total 
loans with 56 loans, accounting for approximately 57%. The providers for loans over 5 million have not 
been formal lenders but semi formal and informal ones. These two sectors have in turn supplied 23.23% 
and 20.2% of total loans. It is approximately 41% and 31% of total 56 big loans. The non farm 
households have explained that their demands to credit are quite big, they even have required not only 
one loan over 5 million VND but also several of this loan.  Formal lenders usually apply credit rationing 
in terms of number of loans and amount of credit per household, especially with fiduciary loans or loans 
without collaterals. Therefore, they have gone to semi formal and informal sector where number of 
loans is not restricted.  
Table 5.16: Number of borrowing households by credit sectors  
Total sample 
(n=45) 
Agricultural 
 households 
(n=7) 
Agricultural -  
Non farm 
households 
(n=12) 
Non farm 
households 
(n=26) 
 
No. of 
hhs. 
%  No. 
of 
hhs. 
% * No. 
of 
hhs. 
% * No
. of 
hhs
% * 
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. 
Formal, semi 
formal and  
informal sector 31 68.89 5 
11.11 
(71.43) 9 
20.00 
(75.00) 17 
37.78 
(65.38) 
Formal, semi 
formal sector 2 4.44 1 
2.22 
(14.29) 1 
2.22 
(8.33) 0 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Formal and 
informal sector 4 8.89 1 
2.22 
(14.29) 2 
4.44 
(16.67) 1 
2.22 
(3.85) 
Semi formal and 
informal sector 6 13.33 0 
0.00 
(0.00) 0 
0.00 
(0.00) 6 
13.33 
(23.08) 
Semi formal 
sector 2 4.44 0 
0.00 
(0.00) 0 
0.00 
(0.00) 2 
4.44 
(7.69) 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
(*)Numbers in the first row are compared with 
the total sample; numbers in second row (in 
parentheses) are compared with each group of 
households 
Though credit market have been 
segmented by loan size in aspect of credit 
sectors as well as groups of households as 
mentioned above, the market has still 
included the interaction among credit 
sectors. Figures from table 5.16 showed that 
most households have received loans from 
two to three sectors and only 4.44% of them 
have just obtained from one lender. The 
most common in total sample as well as in 
each group is households getting credit from 
all  
Figure 5.2: Sectors of borrowing 
three sectors. There are nearly 69% of total households receiving loans from all sectors, of which, non 
farm households have occupied the biggest share, at 37.78%. In comparison within each group, the rate 
of households who received credit from both formal, semi formal and informal sector has held more 
than 65% in all three groups. It seems that the sample households have had big demand of credit, 
hence, they have taken as much as possible amount of credit, suitable with their conditions, from all 
sectors. Of course the prioritized order of lenders in their choices is differential among groups due to 
their different conditions. 
Briefly, agricultural households have obtained credit with the smallest amount in average, of which 
50.7% come from formal sector. Mixed group and non farm group have been not much different in 
credit volume. However, the biggest part in volume of credit of agricultural households and mixed 
households has come from formal sector, whereas, in non farm group, the biggest share has belonged to 
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informal sector. Looking from ratio of transaction by loan size, majority of loans in agricultural 
households and in mixed households have been small size (up to 5 million VND), and has belonged to 
informal sector. For non farm households, on the contrary, big size loans (over 5 million) have 
occupied  the majority of loans, and have come from semi formal and informal lenders. Though 
segmented by loan size, the market has still included the interaction among credit sectors. Most 
households have received loans from two to three sectors, only 4.44% of them have just obtained from 
one lender.  
5.5.2 Segmented by duration  
Together size and duration of loan are also features that both lenders and borrowers pay attention to. 
In fact, the demand on loan durations of the different borrowers is not similar. In addition, from lender 
side, the different providers also target at the different groups of clients with distinct duration of loan. 
So what are the characteristics of lenders as well as borrowers in term of loan? How has this feature 
been segmented in Phu Thuong credit market? These questions will be interpreted in this part.  
Table 5.17: Average loan period by credit sectors and household groups 
Total sample 
(n=45) 
Agricultural 
households 
(n= 7) 
Mixed       
households 
(n=12) 
Non farm 
households 
(n=26) 
 
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Formal sector 28.91 12.72 22.06 11.59 27.42 13.86 29.11 13.55 
Semi formal 
sector 
11.37 2.18 10.13 2.27 11.11 2.71 11.61 1.92 
Informal 
sector 
5.12 4.16 1.74 2.89 7.85 4.09 4.92 4.67 
Total  17.22 11.38 13.14 8.31 20.33 11.85 14.45 11.86 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
In general, there has been a big gap between credit sectors as well as groups of borrowers in terms of 
loan duration. For total sample, average of credit period was recorded at 17.22 month. However, this 
figure in formal sector is much bigger than that in other sectors and mean of sample. Formal lenders 
have provided loans with approximately 29 months of duration in average, it means more than 5 times 
longer than that in informal sector.  
Reason why loan period is extremely different among sectors can be answered by looking at 
characters of lenders and purposes of loans. Survey data have showed that all loans from formal lenders 
are bigger than 12 months, even reached up to 48 months in case borrowing for education. According 
to Government policy, VBSP will provide loan to households who has one or more members studying 
at universities or colleges with duration equalling period of study time. Moreover, some big loans in 
VBARD have come to 60 months in duration. In addition, majority of loans from informal sector has 
been used for foods temporarily. Informal providers have not had enough financial capacity to supply 
credit so long. Furthermore, though loan terms in informal sector are usually unspecified before hand, 
but the borrowers have often spent priority for repaying first to avoid high interest rate. Therefore, the 
figure of loan term in formal sector has stayed at high level while in informal lenders has remained at 
low level. 
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In specific group, this pattern has been repeated. Loan term is always longest in formal sector and 
shortest in informal one. However, the level of gap in loan duration between formal and informal 
sector is not similar among different groups. For agricultural group, loans from informal lenders have 
had the shortest term, at level of 1.74 months, it means more than 12 times smaller than that from 
formal lenders. With mixed households and non farm households, this gap is only about 3.5 times and 
5.9 times, respectively. 
Table 5.18: Number of loans by duration scale and household groups 
Total sample 
(numbers of 
loans=174) 
Agricultural 
households 
(numbers of 
loans=29) 
Mixed households 
(numbers of 
loans=46) 
Non farm 
households (numbers 
of loans=99) 
 
No. of 
loans 
%* No. of 
loans 
%* No. of 
loans 
%* No. of 
loans 
%* 
Number of loans 
up to 6 months 
57 32.76 11 
6.32 
(37.93) 
8 
4.60 
(17.39) 
38 
21.84 
(38.38) 
Number of loans 
from 6 to         
12 months 
76 43.68 11 
6.32 
(37.93) 
25 
14.37 
(54.35) 
40 
22.99 
(40.40) 
Number of loans 
longer than       
12 months 
41 23.56 7 
4.02 
(24.14) 
13 
7.47 
(28.26) 
21 
12.07 
(21.21) 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
(*)Numbers in the first row are compared with total sample, numbers in second row (in parentheses) are 
compared with each group of households 
Figures in table 5.17 and table 5.18 have revealed clearly that from lenders’ aspect, segment of loans 
with duration shorter than 6 months has belonged to informal lenders while formal ones in turn have 
taken segment of term loan longer than 12 months. The rest segment from 6 to 12 months of loan 
period has been occupied by semi formal lenders. 
Among three segments, the segment of loan duration from 6 to 12 months has held the largest 
portion with 76 loans, accounting for 43.68% of total loans. The segment of loans longer than 12 
months has kept the smallest rate with 23.56% of total loan. Through group discussions it has been 
found that because most loans have served consumption and production purposes at small scale so 
borrowers usually asking for medium period of loan. Whereas, numbers of borrowers getting loan for 
big investment such as building storehouse, buying equipments of paying education fees are not much. 
Therefore, the segment of long term loan has had smallest share. 
From borrower’s aspect, fragmenting within each household group is not strong, except in case of 
mixed households. It is due to the diversity in credit sources that borrowers obtain loans from. Because 
the different credit lenders are extremely different in loan period, hence, if borrowers get loan from 
many sources, the duration will be varied. In particular case of mixed group, the segment of short term 
loan has revealed much smaller share in comparison other segments within group as well as other 
groups, at level of 4.6% of total loans and 17.39% of loans in the group. It is caused by the special 
feature in income sources of this group. In this light, mixed households have income from both farming 
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and non farm activities, thus, this group can more or less fulfill temporary deficit for daily foods. That is 
why this group has not gotten so much short loans, which are mainly for foods. 
In short, regarding to duration of loans, there has been a big gap among credit sectors. Formal 
lenders have provided loans with long time of duration in average, more than 5 times longer than that 
in informal sector. The rest segment from 6 to 12 months of loan period has dominated by semi formal 
lenders. From borrowers aspect, segmenting within each household groups by loan duration is not 
strong, due to the diversity in credit sources that borrowers obtain loans from. 
5.5.3 Segmented by loan purposes  
Through the micro-econometric analysis of household surveys, Bao Duong & Izumida (2002) 
claimed that the rural credit market in Vietnam is quite segmented. In that light, they found out the 
formal sector is specialized in lending for production activities whereas the lending purposes of informal 
sector are quite diverse. How rural credit market in study site is segmented? How are the market in 
particular Phu Thuong case different from general market in previous research in rural credit field? In 
this part, these questions will be discussed. 
Table 5.19: Lending purposes in the different lenders 
Lenders Education purpose Production purpose Consumption purpose 
VBARD Depend on clients Yes Depend on clients 
VBSP Yes Yes No 
Sacombank Yes Yes Yes 
TYM Fund Yes Yes Yes 
PTAC No Yes No 
Moneylenders Yes Yes Yes 
Shopkeepers No Yes Yes 
ROSCAs Yes Yes Yes 
Relatives and friends Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Compiled by author from Group discussions, Key informant interview and household survey, 2009 
Information about lending purposes has been collected and cross checked through Group 
discussions, Key informant interview and household survey. The results have been synthesized and 
presented in table 6.18. According to that, the lending purposes have been recorded differently among 
credit sectors as well as among lenders in each sector. The lenders are divided into two groups by level 
of variety in credit products, including group of lenders with multiform credit services and group of 
lenders with uniform credit services. The first group has comprised Sacombank, TYM Fund, 
moneylenders, ROSCAs, and relatives and friends. The second group has embraced VBARD, VBSP, 
PTAC, and shopkeepers. The first group has provided loan mainly in cash to clients for both 
production and consumption purposes and education. The second group has delivered credit in kind or 
in cash or both for either education and production purposes or consumption and production 
objectives. Especially, PTAC has only served loan for production demand.  
From table 6.18, it can be concluded in general that credit market in Phu Thuong commune has 
been segmented in term of lending purposes. In this respect, the segment of production purpose has 
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been supplied by all lenders whereas the segment of education aim and the segment of consumption 
purposes have been distributed over some lenders.  
Loans for spending on education have not been accepted by VBARD (cases of loans without 
collaterals) PTAC and shopkeepers. Support to production activities is the mission of PTAC, hence, 
this organization focus just on production purpose. With shopkeepers, they have mostly delivered 
goods, thus, it is difficult for them to serve education purpose, which has mainly based on credit in 
cash. The segment for education has been prioritized by VBSP due to assistant policy for pupils and 
students from the Government. Other lenders have accepted their clients using loans for education but 
not set priority like in VBSP.  
Credit for consumption has not been targeted by VBSP, PTAC and VBARD (cases of loans 
without collaterals). The rest of the providers have supplied credit for consumption, but in fact, most of 
them have not cared whether the borrowers use loans for consumption or not. Only in particular case 
of Sacombank has seemed targeting at this purpose when Sacombank has concentrated its promoting on 
people who do not conduct production or trade activities but work as official labour and get salary 
every month.  
With VBARD, regarding to lending purpose, there is the difference between information from key 
informant interview and information from group discussions and household survey. Staff of VBARD 
have affirmed that lending on education and consumption is one of many services of VBARD. 
However, results from group discussion and household survey have revealed that VBARD provides 
only credit for production purpose. Author has cross checked information one more time and 
recognized that VBARD will supply clients with education and consumption loan if clients have 
regular and stable income (salary in normal case) and have financial capacity to repay loan, other cases 
VBARD only lends production purpose, especially for loans without collaterals. In the study sample, all 
loans from VBARD have been asked for production and most of them are small and without collateral 
loans (not bigger than 5 million VND), thus, information of local clients is different from that of 
VBARD’s representative.   
In comparison with study of Bao Duong & Izumida (2002), Phu Thuong case has had some 
different points. That is rural credit market has been segmented by lending purposes into segment of 
production purpose and segment of other purposes not  completely from formal or informal sector 
aspect but also from the different lenders. In this light, each credit sector in general can take part in all 
segments. Only looking at each lender, the distinction in segment that this lender participates in is clear. 
From the aspect of each lender, it can be identified clearly that a certain lender supplies certain 
segments, like discussed above.  
It is worth to note that reality purposes of loans have been different from that in credit contracts. 
Sometimes in the application, the borrowers had required loan for this purpose but after getting loan 
they had used it for other purpose or divided it into many parts for many purposes. Table 5.20 has 
expressed this situation.  
Table 5.20:  The differences between purposes for using credit on paper and in reality (% of sample 
household)*  
Loan purposes  On paper In reality 
Production  84.44 88.89 
Consumption  17.78 100 
Education  15.56 33.33 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
(*) One household may get many loans for several purposes, hence, total is over 100% 
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The figures in table 5.20 are the ratio of sample households who had used loans (whole or a part of 
loans) for a certain purpose. It is interesting to see that the disparity between loan purposes on paper 
and in reality was the most obvious with consumption purpose. There have been only about 18% of 
surveyed households who had submitted application for consumption but 100% of them using credit 
for this purpose. This disparity can be explained by two reasons. The first, most consumption credit in 
kind from informal lenders have not required loan applications with exact using purpose. The second, 
because some lenders have not given loan if requiring for consumption, whereas all lenders accept loan 
for production purpose, therefore borrowers have tended to ask loans for production and then they 
have shared those loans out between education and consumption purposes. This situation can make 
potential risks higher because using loans for consumption does not create profit like for production, 
therefore, borrowers may fall into bad debt status. Moreover, most loans which were applied for 
production are without collaterals, thus, if borrowers change loan purpose from production to 
consumption, lenders will have to deal with difficulties in withdrawing the loans.  
 The rate of households using loans in reality has been higher than that on paper not only in 
consumption case but also in production and education purpose. Government policy on supporting 
credit to education applies only to students who are studying at universities or colleges, not to pupils in 
primary, secondary and high schools. Therefore, there has been few households (less than 16%) who 
have required credit for this purpose on application, whereas in reality more than twice as many 
households spend loans on education in general. 
In summary, with regard to loan purposes, the segmentation has not been only from each credit 
sector aspect, but also from the different lenders. One group of lenders has provided all types of credit 
services and another group of lenders has provided only one to two among production, education and 
consumption loans. It is worth to note that reality purposes of loans have been significantly different 
from that in credit contracts. Most borrowers had required loan for a certain purpose in the application, 
but after getting loan they had used it for other purposes or divided it into many parts for many 
purposes.  
5.5.4 Segmented by interest rate  
Interest rate is the important term in credit contract. Both borrowers and lenders care about this 
term when they carry out loan transactions. Table 5.21 provides the figures related to average interest 
rate of loans and evidences about the segmentation of rural credit market in the study site.  
In general, the segmentation of interest rate has been revealed clearly among credit sectors, especially 
between formal sector and the two other sectors. It has been separated into subsidized-low interest rate 
and market-high interest rate. Average interest rate of loans in formal sector is lowest, approximately a 
half of that in semi formal sector and informal one. The low level of interest rate at 0.877% per month 
on average of this sector had been reached because of the concessionary interest rate from VBSP’s loans. 
Accounting for the significant quantity of loans in formal sector, VBSP has served credit with subsidized 
interest rate by policy of the Government, at 0.5% to 0.65% per month.  
Table 5.21: Average interest rate of loans by credit sectors and household group categories (%/month)* 
Total sample 
(n=45) 
Agricultural 
households      
(n= 7) 
Mixed 
households 
(n=12) 
Non farm 
households 
(n=26) 
 
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Formal sector 0.877 0.287 0.675 0.171 0.838 0.197 0.961 0.345 
Semi formal sector 1.730 0.300 1.560 0.310 1.694 0.369 1.763 0.260 
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Informal sector 1.617 1.111 2.027 1.070 1.369 0.578 1.586 1.223 
Total  1.316 0.861 1.281 0.869 1.139 0.536 1.441 0.957 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
(*) Interest rate of loans from semi formal and informal lenders are not always be counted by month, author has 
calculated and unified them into month 
It is interesting to note that semi formal sector, instead of informal sector as normal expectation, has 
held the highest interest rate among three sectors. Both TYM Fund and PTAC of semiformal sector 
have provided loan with fixed interest rate at level of 1.815% per month and 1% per month, 
respectively. Moreover, the number of loans from TYM Fund have occupied the majority in total loans 
of semi formal, hence, it has lead the interest rate of the sector in average to level of 1.73% per month. 
Regarding the informal sector; even though it has included moneylenders who have lent with high 
interest rate, at around 2% -5%/month, has only kept the second position in comparison with the 
interest rate of two other sectors. One of reasons here is due to some providers giving credit at the very 
low interest rate in informal sector. Relatives and friends have often lent money with subsidized interest 
rate, even at 0%. The survey results have revealed that these lenders have given loans as helping due to 
kinship or friendship instead of profit, thus, they have not asked high interest rate. Moreover, few 
ROSCAs which have been established among official staffs have also provided loan free of charge in 
lending to members. They have explained that, because they were colleagues so should help each other 
in difficult situations of life. That will make the relationship among them be tighter, not only in life but 
also in work. The reasons relating to social aspect for setting low interest rate among relatives, friends 
and colleagues have contributed to lower the interest rate of whole sector. Another reason causing the 
average interest rate to be not so high in informal sector is because of the small proportion of the high 
interest rate loans from moneylenders in the total volume of informal credit. Amount of money that 
had been borrowed from this source has just occupied 18% of total (61 million VND in comparison 
with 340.1 million VND). 
Dissimilar to the segmentation among credit sectors, the segmentation of interest rate among 
household groups is not apparent. Average interest rate of loans in three groups have not fluctuated 
much, changing from 1.281% per month in agricultural group to 1.441% per month in non farm 
group. This situation is caused by the variety in credit sources that households can ask for loans. As 
mentioned in part 5.5.1, the sample households have borrowed from not only one but also many 
lenders from three credit sectors, therefore, average interest rate within group have been mixed among 
loans. However, there is a distinction that should be considered in agricultural households. That is loans 
from informal sector which have been obtained by this group have reached to more than 2% per 
month, beeing the highest level within this group as well as in comparison with other groups. Loans 
from informal sector of agricultural households have mainly been lent by moneylenders, who have 
charged high interest rate normally. By doing so, the loans belonging to informal sector of agricultural 
group have incurred high interest rate. 
To get a deep view on the segmentation of credit market, the interest rate will be classified into 
different levels for discussing continuously. Table 5.22 shows the figures related to this issue. 
Table 5.22: Number of loans by interest rate scale and household groups 
 
Total sample 
(numbers of 
loans=174) 
Agricultural 
households  
(numbers of 
loans=29) 
Mixed households 
(numbers of 
loans=46) 
Non farm 
households 
(numbers of 
loans=99) 
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No. of 
loans 
%* No. of 
loans 
%* No. of 
loans 
%* No. of 
loans 
%* 
Interest rate 
lower than 
1%/month 
37 21.26 8 
4.60 
(27.59) 
12 
6.90 
(26.09) 
17 
9.77 
(17.17) 
Interest rate  
1%/month or 
higher 
137 78.74 21 
12.07 
(72.41) 
34 
19.54 
(73.91) 
82 
47.13 
(82.83) 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
(*)Numbers in the first row are compared with total sample, numbers in second row (in parentheses) are 
compared with each group of households 
From table 5.22 it can be found that in general, loans with interest rate over 1%/month which can 
be called market interest rate, have occupied the majority of total loans, accounting for up to 78.74%. 
This pattern has been repeated in all three household groups. Ratio of loans with market interest rate 
has been relatively similar among the different groups, at level of about 72% to 83%. Loans with interest 
rate lower than 1%/month, which can be called subsidized interest rate, have kept only 21.26% of total 
loans. Within each group, this figure in non farm households has been smallest at around 17% while at 
from 26% to 27% in two rest groups. 
The segmentation of loan numbers by scale of interest rate has suited with trait of credit market in 
rural areas. Because lenders who provide subsidized interest rate are not much, only VBSP, relatives and 
friends, and several ROSCAs (which have been established among colleagues in State institutions) 
while credit providers with market interest rate are abundant, including commercial banks (VBARD, 
Sacombank), semi formal lenders, moneylenders, a lot of shopkeepers, and the rest of the ROSCAs.  
From above discussions, it can be concluded that beside duration, purpose and amount of loans, the 
segmentation of interest rate has been revealed clearly among credit sectors, especially between formal 
sector and the two rest sectors. It has been separated into subsidized-low interest rate in formal sector 
and market-high interest rate in informal and semi formal sector. Average interest rate of loans in 
formal sector is lowest, approximately a half of that in semi formal sector and informal one. From 
borrowers’ aspect, the segmentation of interest rate among household groups has not been clear because 
of the variety in credit sources that households ask for loans.  
5.6 Reasons for segmenting of credit market in Phu Thuong commune 
The sections above have discussed about main lenders, borrower groups in rural credit market and 
clarified their characteristics; made clear the differences between borrowing and non borrowing groups 
as well as among borrowing groups in lending - borrowing transactions. By doing so, the questions 
what structure of rural credit market is, what the different characteristics among borrowers as well as 
among lenders in lending are, how the rural credit market segmented is have been clarified. The 
remaining questions are what reasons and conditions make the rural credit market segmented, why are 
there differences in choosing credit sources among borrowers. This section will interpret these 
questions through policy-based explanations, information and conditions of transaction.  
5.6.1 Policy-based reasons 
Government policies are the important factors influencing financial markets, in general, and the 
segmentation of credit markets, in particular. The impacts of policies on segmenting of rural credit 
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market are in some cases direct, some others  indirect. It can influence the whole market or just some 
sectors in the market. Its effects may either be temporary or long term. 
Empirical evidences in study site have demonstrated that several legal documents have influenced on 
segmenting of credit market in Phu Thuong commune. First of all, the rule on the maximum interest 
rate of Civil Code (2005) and the regulation on basis interest rate of State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) have 
framed the interest rate of commercial banks. According to the Civil Code, all credit institutions are 
not allowed to lend at interest rate 150% bigger than the basic interest rate, and SBV set the basic 
interest rate changing from 7% to 8%/year during 2009, therefore, most commercial banks, including 
VBARD and Sacombank, applied interest rate within 10.5% to 12%/year. It also means that 
commercial banks will hold the segment by interest rate from 7% to 12%/year, even from 10.5% to 
12%/year because all banks want to get maximum profit.  
In recent years, the Government has promulgated many programs which provide subsidized interest 
rate to target groups, including the poor and students. The interest rates in these programs have been 
regulated by the Government at level 6% to 7.8%/year (equivalent with 0.5% to 0.65% per month). 
These programs have created a new sub-segment in formal sector with low interest rate in rural credit 
market, in which, VBSP is the unique lender. Moreover, this policy has pulled significant amount of 
clients from other lenders, especially from informal sector such as moneylenders, shopkeepers, who 
often charge high interest rate, coming to VBSP to get subsidized interest rate. An evidence for this 
status is that even though subsidized credit programs has been built for the poor and households who 
have members studying at universities or colleges, the data from VBSP and local authority revealed that, 
nearly 24% of total households in Phu Thuong commune have obtained credit from VBSP under the 
title of poor households. However, the rate of poverty in the commune is only 2.02% of total 
households. In addition, the expansion of low interest rate segment will make semi formal and informal 
sector tend to get a smaller share of the market, more or less. 
Another policy in last period that has influenced the segmentation of the credit market was the 
credit rationing policy in the period from the late half of year 2008 to the early half of year 2009, to 
deal with the quick increase of inflation rate. Hence, the borrowers had to rely on informal and semi 
formal credit for urgent needs, though the interest rate in these sectors were higher. Analysing data 
from household survey and individual interviews has revealed that due to this policy, the borrowers had 
difficulties to get loans from formal sector as the waiting time for loans was longer than before, in some 
cases up to 3 months. Most borrowers have responded that they do not know the roots of reason why 
they cannot get loans with the short waiting time like before the late half of year 2008. Their answers 
have been only because “the banks’ capital was not available at that time”. Many loans for education 
from VBSP had to wait several months. Instead of getting money after starting of the term in 
colleges/universities from 1 to 1.5 months, the VBSP’s borrowers have received those loans in the 
third, even the fourth month of the semester. In VBARD source, the effect of credit rationing was not 
only on the waiting time for getting loans but also on volume of loans. All credit group leaders have 
allowed credit without collateral only for loans smaller or equal to 5 million VND like other clients, 
instead of the priority level of 10 million VND as before 2008 from this bank. The increasing demand 
for credit from informal and semiformal sector has influenced more or less on the segmentation of 
market. According to that, the borrowers who had credit demand for education and production would 
change into relying much more on informal and semiformal sources as compared to before. 
Briefly, from aspect of policy, the rules on maximum interest rate have framed the interest rate of 
lenders. In addition, many subsidized interest rate programs provide to target groups have created a new 
sub-segment in formal sector with low interest rate in rural credit market. Moreover, the expansion of 
low interest rate segment will make semi formal and informal sector tend to have a smaller share of the 
market, more or less. On the contrary, credit rationing policy has caused the difficulty to the borrowers 
on getting loans from the formal sector; hence, they had to rely on informal and semi formal credit for 
imperative needs. 
5.6.2 Information and conditions of transacting reasons 
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Together with policy, an issue that can influence on segmenting of credit market is related to lack of 
information. In some cases, depending on the variety or lack of information, borrowers were lead to 
the different credit sources. Table 5.23 shows the information channels for obtaining credit of local 
borrowers.  
Table 5.23: Information channels for obtaining credit 
Information sources  Total 
sample 
(n=45) 
Agricultural 
households 
(n=7) 
Mixed 
households 
(n=12) 
Non farm 
households 
(n=26) 
Neighbors   42.22 71.43 33.33 38.46 
Local authorities  82.22 100 100 69.23 
Mass communication means 11.11 14.29 16.67 7.69 
Relatives or friends  28.89 28.57 25.00 30.77 
Introductions of commercial banks  8.89 0 0 15.38 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
From table 5.23, it can be said that local authorities contributes the important role in orienting local 
people go to the given lenders. Local authorities usually provide information related to formal credit 
sector, especially information about VBSP and VBARD. That may be essential reason explaining why 
there were 37 among 45 households getting loans from formal sector (see table 6.15). It is interesting to 
note that no one of agricultural households as well as mixed households get information from 
commercial banks, while this figure in non farm groups is more than 15%. It may be due to this, that 
no one of agricultural group obtain credit from commercial banks, whereas there are 4 households in 
non farm group having loans from Sacombank. Box 5.1 illustrates how information affect borrowers’ 
decisions. 
Box 5.1 Why I do not borrow from commercial banks 
Source: In depth interview, 2009 
However, in many cases, though information is clear, people know where to get credit, but it is not 
always they get loans from that sources, table 5.24 shows this situation. 
Table 5.24: The distinction between awareness about available credit sources and practice in borrowing from 
certain lenders (% of total households) 
Mrs. G, a member of agricultural - non farm households, said about the reasons she has obtained 
loan from VBSP: “The Head of Women Union in the commune have let me know how to get a 
loan from VBSP, thus, I borrowed 5 million VND from this bank in early of year 2009. I stay at 
home for doing garden and housework. I have not opportunity to contact with other banks or 
official organizations, so I do not known where and how to ask credit from commercial banks. 
Moreover, I am not good in doing loan procedures, which may be not easy in these banks. 
Therefore I have only borrowed from VBSP where I have been helped in procedures from the Head 
of Women Union, not from other banks”.  
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Credit sources Awareness Gotten loans already 
VBARD 95.56 40.00 
VBSP 93.33 66.67 
TYM 88.89 86.67 
Sacombanks  15.56 8.89 
Moneylenders 80.00 28.89 
ROSCAs 57.78 57.78 
PTAC 24.44 15.56 
Shopkeepers  93.33 84.44 
Relatives and Friends 35.56 4.44 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
The numbers on table 5.24 revealed that, though people have information about credit sources and 
have credit demands but they are not sure how to get loan from these sources. This status was shown 
by ratio of households getting loans from a certain lender is always equal or much smaller than 
percentage of households being aware of it. To explain why this scene exists, we continue interpreting 
with other reasons below. 
Other conditions also have affected the segmentation of credit market. From lenders aspect, lenders’ 
development strategies in market are recorded as the factors that impact directly on segmenting. 
Lenders have based on the particular strategy to set the terms and conditions of credit contract that are 
suitable for their target group. By doing so, they have selected by themselves the given client groups in 
the separated segments. For instance, the mission of VBSP is to support credit to the poor, therefore, 
this bank has designed the loan with low interest rate, small size and without collaterals that appropriate 
to the poor. As a result, the credit segment of subsidized loan has appeared. 
Some cases, due to applying the strict regulation for getting loan from banks have excluded a certain 
group of borrowers and forced them go to other sources, which are more elastic in procedures. 
McCarty & Leader (2001), in a research on credit market in Vietnam, claimed that besides what may be 
once-off “loans” from the VBSP, poor households must turn to relatives or private lenders for loans. 
Another author, Phuong (2006) in a research on access to credit of rural household in Northern 
Vietnam stated that the formal credit sector cannot fully satisfy rural households’ demands for loans, 
hence, leaving a large market for the informal credit sector to operate. 
In the study site, commercial banks such as VBARD, Sacombank have required collateral under 
type of asset or witness of having salary for obtaining credit, thus, people who are without valuable 
properties and/or are not official staffs, cannot received loans from these banks (except for the under 5 
million VND loans from VBARD), and the borrowers had to go to semi formal or informal credit 
sources for satisfying their demands. Particularly, according to local authorities, the ratio of households 
who have certification for using land or “red book”, which has considered as the most worth asset of 
rural people that be used as collateral, is just around 60% of total households - the same situation for 
general Vietnam several years ago. The reason why this figure has remained at low rate during last year 
was also raised in discussion with local authorities. In this light, many households cannot get the “red 
book” because they are using land that is owned by their ancestors, which related to the interests of 
many people in family/clan. It is very difficult for them to collect the signatures of all members in their 
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clan to get the “red book” as requirement from authority’s regulation. Hence, the rural people have 
relied much more on semi formal and informal sector. Segmenting of formal credit market in this 
situation can be seen as dividing into one segment for poor group and another one for rich group. That 
is why VBARD was named as “bank for the rich” by local people. Box 5.2 expressed a story from a 
borrower who has obstacles with VBARD. 
Box 5.2 Why I choose shopkeepers but not VBARD for my loan 
Source: In depth interview, 2009 
Contrary to formal sector, informal lenders have applied flexible rules for obtaining loans, so these 
providers would occupy the segment serving credit for immediate needs or for people who are refused 
by formal lenders. Many rural people obtain their loans from informal sources because it is easy to 
borrow money from them and the loans are available at the time as borrower needs it (Corpuz, 2007). 
Even charging high interest rates, the informal financial institutions are still essential sources providing 
urgent loans timely and easily (Tuan, 2006). This situation have also occurred in Phu Thuong 
commune when many borrowers have expressed that though high interest rate, shopkeepers and 
moneylenders had been their choices because of simple and rapid procedures. Moreover, these 
providers provide both production and consumption credit, hence, they have become good alternatives 
for consumption demands which are denied from VBSP. 
Box 5.3 Why I choose TYM Fund to get a loan 
Source: In depth interview, 2009 
Borrowers are not always to remain passive or be pushed into a certain sector for credit. Sometime, 
they are active side to choose the suitable lenders for their conditions by themselves. TYM Fund is a 
typical case of this situation. This lender has not only provided credit to the member, but also collected 
regular saving. Repayment schedule that TYM Fund has applied is easy for borrowers who have small 
Mr. T, an agricultural household head, has confined: “ I have 1500 m2 of garden land that my 
parents have owned before. Now both of them died and I keep this land. I need around 15 million 
VND to invest in raising pigs. I have asked from VBARD and this bank has required me showing 
collaterals under type of valuable assets or land use certificate. However, my land is without land 
use certificate and I also have no worth asset. Hence, VBARD has refused my application. At the 
present, I have built a new pig cage already but I am in debt to shopkeepers and my younger sister. 
I have received credit in kind (building materials) from Mr. H (a shopkeeper) and gotten 5 million 
VND from my sister to buy breeding pigs and pay for bricklayers who build the pig cage. Of 
course, Mr. H and my sister have not required me to have collaterals”.  
Mrs. X, a member of TYM Fund during the last 11 years, talked about her choice among many 
credit sources: “I have a small shop for buying foods and other household goods so I just have 
borrowed 8 million VND from TYM Fund for working capital. There are several sources for asking 
loans in my commune but I have chosen TYM Fund because the conditions and repayment schedule 
that this lender has required are appropriate to me. To get a loan, I just register at group leader and 
about one to two week later, I go to group leader house, show my identity card and sign my name to 
get loan. I have to pay back this loan during 50 weeks since the time I receive it. I have income from 
shop, though not much but every day, hence, I can repay easily by weekly instalments for that debt. 
Moreover, included in the  200,000 VND I pay weekly, 20,200 VND is my saving money. I really 
like this service, because other lenders do not accept small amount of saving weekly like that. After 
every 5 years, I get back this saving account to spend on other purpose”.  
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income every day. Therefore, this provider has seemed to shape a segment of credit service for small 
traders with saving service. Box 5.3 expressed the reasons leading a borrower making decision about 
where she goes to ask for a loan.  
In short, information and conditions of transaction are also the reasons for segmenting of credit market. 
In many cases, depending on the variety or lack of information, borrowers were lead to the different 
credit sources. However, in some cases, though information is clear, people have credit demands and 
know where to get credit but it is not always they get loans from that sources. From lenders aspect, 
lenders’ development strategies in market are recorded as the factors that impact directly on segmenting. 
Some other cases, due to applying the strict regulation for getting loan, formal sector have excluded a 
certain group of borrowers and forced them go to other sources which are more elastic in procedures. 
Contrary to formal sector, informal lenders with flexible rules for obtaining loans have occupied the 
segment which serving credit for immediate needs or for people who are refused by formal lenders. 
Moreover, providing both production- and consumption credit; hence, informal lenders have become 
good alternatives for consumption demands.  
5.7 Similarities and Differences in findings 
The results from Phu Thuong commune case study reveal both similarities and differences in 
findings in comparison with previous studies. 
Some similar points are related to the reasons causing the credit market segmentation. In this light, 
the author and McCarty & Leader (2001) both had found out that the subsidized lending interest rate 
charged by the banks (VBSP and VBARD) is one of the reasons leading to the segmentation of credit 
market in Vietnam. The study in Phu Thuong commune had also conceded that information affects the 
credit market segmentation, as is the conclusions in research of Aryeetey et al, (1997) for case studies of 
Sub-Saharan Africa countries, as well as Tschach (2003), and Pinheiro & Moura (2003) in Brazilian 
credit market. Another reason leading to the segmentation of credit market is the different collateral 
conditions that the borrowers can offer for their loans. This finding has also been raised before by Bali 
Swain (2009), (2001) and Pham & Lensink (2007) in their studies.  
Data from the study in Phu Thuong commune had also identified the same performances of credit 
market segmentation as the conclusion in the study of Bali Swain (2001). In that light, the formal sector 
lent mainly for productive purposes at subsidized interest rates, whereas, the informal sector lends small 
loans for consumption purposes, at comparatively higher interest rates.  
The last one is related to policy issue. Aryeetey et al, (1997), Pham & Lensink (2007) and the author 
all had recognized that policies from the Government are essential factors influencing on segmenting in 
credit market. 
Besides, the study has some different points in reason for credit market segmentation, exclusive 
groups as well as lending purposes.  
Firstly, Bali Swain (2009) had found out that monopolist power of the village moneylenders is a 
reason causing the segmentation in credit market. In Phu Thuong case, though moneylenders existed in 
the commune, the author has not yet found any evidence of monopoly causing segmentation. 
Montgomery (1991), in a research on credit market in Italy, stressed that geographical conditions are 
deeper roots of segmenting credit market than government regulations. Furthermore, Aryeetey (1992) 
had suggested the reason of high transaction costs in seeking formal financial services. Whereas, in the 
study, the author had seen that not only the terms of credit transactions, information and transaction 
conditions, but also policy issue are the main reasons of the credit market segmentation.  
Secondly, Yadav et al. (1992) had concluded that small, collateral-poor farmers are excluded from 
the formal sector and are forced to depend on informal sector, whereas the empirical evidences from 
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the study had revealed that many formal credit programs have targeted to the poor, and many cases 
have been lending without collaterals. 
Finally, a different point that the author has found is about lending purpose in formal credit sector. 
Bao Duong & Izumida (2002) argued that the formal sector had been specialized in lending for 
production activities, while the author had evidences to affirm that this sector provides credit not only 
for production, but also for education and consumption purposes. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 Conclusion 
The research aims to understand how the credit market is segmented in Phu Thuong commune - a 
rural region of Thua Thien Hue province. It concentrates on answering the questions: Is there 
segmentation? And; Is there a good match between availability of credit, their characteristics and the 
conditions, needs of the borrowers in the rural market in Vietnam?  
This study was based on synthesizing the related literatures and analyzing data from field work 
which comprises the results from a household survey, group discussions, individual interviews and 
observations. The research was designed with view point from both lenders’ side and borrowers’ side. 
The comparisons were conducted among lenders as well as among borrower groups. 
The results of the study reveal that there is a simultaneous existence and operation of many lenders 
(formal, semi formal and informal sectors) and borrower groups in Phu Thuong Commune. Among 
them, VBSP is the biggest lender in the commune with more than 9 billion VND of loans outstanding.  
Beside the similarities in business place and responsibility in supplying loans to local clients, each 
credit sector have particular characteristics in terms of kind of credit products/services, scale and 
duration of credit, number of transactions, interest rate, loans purposes, as well as process of disbursing 
credit. 
Segmentation of financial markets in developing countries are often described in the sense that 
different groups of borrowers are served by different lending intermediaries (Conning & Udry, 2005). 
In Phu Thuong case study, the segmentation of credit market is not completely across lenders as well as 
borrower groups. However, the segmentation here is recognized in each terms of a credit transaction. 
In that light, the credit market is segmented in aspects of purpose, duration, interest rate, and amount of 
loans.  
With regard to loan purposes, the segmentation has not been completely from each credit sector 
aspect but from the different lenders. One group of lenders has served all credit services and another 
group of lenders has provided only one to two among production, education and consumption loans. It 
is worth to note that reality purposes of loans have been significantly different from that in credit 
contracts. Most borrowers had required loan for a certain purpose in the application but after getting 
loan they had used it for other purposes or divided it into many parts for many purposes.  
Regarding to duration of loans, there has been a big gap among credit sectors. Formal lenders have 
provided loans with long time of duration, informal sector have lent short period loans, while semi 
formal lenders have dominated medium term of loans. From borrowers aspect, segmenting within each 
household groups by loan duration is not obvious, due to the diversity in credit sources that borrowers 
obtaining loans from. 
In terms of loan size, agricultural households have obtained credit with the smallest amount in 
average, and majority of that comes from formal sector. Mixed group and non farm group have been 
not much different in credit volume. However, the biggest part in volume credit of agricultural 
households and mixed households has come from formal sector, whereas, in non farm group, the 
biggest share has belonged to informal sector. Looking from ratio of transaction by loan size, majority 
of loans in agricultural households and in mixed households have been small size (up to 5 million 
VND), and has belonged to informal sector. For non farm households, on the contrary, big size loans 
(over 5 million) have dominated and the majority of loans have come from semi formal and informal 
lenders. Though segmented by loan size, the market still has interaction among credit sectors, and only 
4.44% of borrowers have just obtained from one credit sector.  
Beside duration, purpose and amount of loans, the segmentation of interest rate has been revealed 
obviously among credit sectors, especially between formal sector and the two other sectors. Average 
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interest rate of loans in formal sector is lowest, approximately a half of that in semi formal sector and 
informal one. From borrowers’ aspect, the segmentation of interest rate among household groups has 
not been clear because of the variety in credit sources that households ask for loans.  
About the reasons of segmenting credit market, policy issue, information and conditions of 
transacting have recorded as main reasons.  
From aspect of policy, the rules on maximum interest rate have framed the interest rate of lenders. 
In addition, many subsidized interest rate programs provided to target groups have created a new sub-
segment in formal sector with low interest rate in rural credit market. Moreover, the expansion of low 
interest rate segment will make semi formal and informal sector tend to have a smaller share of the 
market, more or less. On the other hand, credit rationing policy has caused the difficulty to the 
borrowers in getting loans from formal sector; hence, they had to rely on informal and semi formal 
credit for urgent needs. 
In many cases, depending on the variety or lack of information, borrowers were lead to the different 
credit sources. From lenders aspect, lenders’ development strategies in market are recorded as the factors 
that impact directly on segmenting. Some other cases, due to applying the strict regulation for getting 
loan, formal sector have excluded a certain group of borrowers and forced them go to other sources 
which are more elastic in procedures. Contrary to formal sector, informal lenders with flexible rules for 
obtaining loans have occupied the segment, which serve credit for immediate needs or for people who 
are refused by formal lenders.  
6.2 Lessons learnt 
Some lessons that the author has drawn after conducting the study may be concerned for the further 
research. They are mainly in the way to design the study.  
First of all is aspect to look the credit market segmentation. The study has discussed only the 
categories of income generating activities and ignored assessing the segmentation of market in relation 
to wealth status, as several previous researches, because of the low percentage of poor household in the 
commune. However, it can be based on other categories to assess segmentation such as gender, 
settlement situation, transportation condition, ethnic group, etc, to get broader view of the credit 
market. 
Selecting randomly borrowers households from the list that was provided by local authorities has the 
limitation of mainly covering borrowers in formal and semiformal sector. It was difficult to represent 
for all credit sectors due to the sensitive issues that borrowers have wanted to hide when they get loans 
from informal sector, especially from moneylenders. This problem may be mitigated by getting 
borrower’s information from authorities both at commune and village level. In addition, it can be 
better if researcher combines asking from authorities and using “snow ball” technique to collect 
representative borrowers. In “snow ball” technique, the researchers start with a certain borrower and 
then gain more information about other borrowers from this person. This process will continue for the 
second, the third borrower and so on. The borrower list will be made longer as the “snow ball” 
becoming gradually bigger after rolling from the mountain. However, it needs long time to conduct 
study.  
Regarding to the difficulties in collecting data related to interest rate of loans from informal sector in 
general, from moneylenders in particular, the author addressed this issue by asking from many indirect 
sources. Most interviewees who have obtained credit from moneylenders did not answer or provided 
inaccurate data related to interest rate because they were afraid of the effect on moneylenders and the 
next time they can be refused by these lenders. It was more difficult to get that information from 
moneylenders. Therefore, the author had gotten that information and cross checked from the 
neighbours of borrowers and moneylenders, as well as from small shopkeepers in the villages (who 
usually get a lot of news through transactions with their clients every day). Of course the information 
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getting by this way is not completely accurate but at least the researcher can get general picture and it is 
much more credible than that in direct collection from borrowers and moneylenders. 
Another limitation in the study is the way to analyze the segmentation of credit market in terms of 
purposes and interest rate of loans. For segmented by loan purposes, the author has only regarded to the 
ratio of sample households who had used loans (whole or a part of loans) for a certain purpose. It will 
be better if the researchers investigate in both proportion of number of surveyed households and the 
rate of loan amount that households using for a certain purpose. Furthermore, when analysing the 
segmentation by interest rate; though a number of lenders all belong to the informal credit sector, the 
disparity among lenders is very big, so the researchers should divide this sector into relatives, friends and 
ROSCAs group on the one hand and moneylenders and shopkeepers group on the other, to see the 
differences. 
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8 APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Lending characteristics by credit sectors in percentages (1997-1998) 
Loan purposes (% of credit volume) Loan allocation (% of credit 
volume) 
Gender of contractor (% 
of credit volume) 
 Credit 
volume 
(%) 
Number of 
loans (% of 
loan 
contracts) Business Consumption Housing and 
other uses 
Rural Urban Female Male 
As a percentage of total 
credit volume 
14,987,843,000VND 
100 - 64.88 13.06 22.06 64.71 35.29 31.09 68.91 
Formal credit sector 46.57 42.34 59.45 28.43 19.44 58.59 24.52 33.47 52.47 
Semiformal credit sector 2.27 3.53 2.56 2.50 1.28 1.84 3.07 2.83 2.02 
Informal sector 51.16 54.13 37.99 69.07 79.28 39.57 72.41 63.70 45.51 
Source: Compiled by author from Pham & Lensink, 2007 
Appendix 2: Rural households loans, average loan size and average borrowing interest rate per month by sources (1997-1998) 
 Informal financial sector Formal and semiformal financial sector 
Ratio of loans (%) 51 49 
Average loan size (1,000 VND) 1,752 3,209 
Average borrowing interest rate (%/month) 3.95 1,26 
Source: Compiled by author from McCarty & Leader, 2001
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Appendix 3: Characteristics of major lenders in semiformal credit sector  
Outstanding loan balance Outstanding savings balance  
Total 
Providers Average size 
of credit groups 
Number of 
groups 
Number of 
members 
Lending models  Number of 
provinces 
covered 
Lending monthly 
interest rate (%) 
Savings deporsits 
monthly interest rate 
(%) 
US$ Million of 
VND 
Obligatory 
(US$) 
Voluntary 
(US$) US$ Million of VND 
Is there 
scheme 
intergrated? 
CEP (**)  11,112 54,346 Grameen Bank    6,309,275  1,335,036 332,397 1,667,433   
Vietnam-Belgium Credit Project (VWU) (**)  5,500 49,444 Grameen Bank    2,953,067  887,867 1,000 888,867   
Action Aid Vietnam (**)  5,540 22,792 Grameen Bank    1,476,467  252,600 686,533 686,533   
Save the Children UK (**)  250 21,000   2.0  213,333  0 100 100   
TYM Fund (**)  4,203 19,462 Grameen Bank    2,405,337  985,803 99,471 1,085,274   
Save the Children US (**)   10,365 solidarity group    383,400  4,067 5,900 9,967   
Save the Children Japan (**)  1,627 8,030 village banking     208,867  39,600 0 39,600   
SNV (**)  830 7,651 village banking     301,467  30,133 53,467 83,600   
Vietnam Plus (**)  1,000 6,200 Grameen Bank    150,000  48,000 113,333 161,333   
VWU-Thach Ha, Ha Tinh province (**)  487 5,388     168,733  75,067 0 75,067   
Rabo Bank (*) 60    8 0.7   82,291    11,930 Yes  
German Restructuring Bank (KFW2) (*) 18    3 Market rate   51,538     Yes 
IFAD (*) 12    1 1.0   41,193    32 Yes 
UNFPA (*) 17    8    25,808    745 Yes 
UNICEF (*) 13    22 1.0 0.15-1.0  14,565    6,402 Yes 
American Oxfarm (*) 5    5 1.0 0.5  10,005    3,643  
Vietnam-Sweden MRDP (*) 40    5 1.0 0.2-0.6  10,000     Yes 
German Restructuring Bank (KFW1) (*) 15    1 1.2   7,988     Yes 
Source: Compiled by author from BWTP, 200?; McCarty & Leader, 2001  (*) as of 2000 (**) as of Sept. 2004
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Appendix 4: Average loan size by lender and household groups (million VND) 
Total sample 
(number of 
loans=174) 
Agricultural 
households 
(number of 
loans=29) 
Agricultural - non 
farm households 
(number of 
loans=46) 
Non farm 
households 
(number of 
loans=99) 
 
Mean  sd Mean  sd Mean  sd Mean  sd 
Formal credit 
(52) 
9.35 4.63 6.89 2.85 8.84 3.96 8.42 3.69 
Of which 
VBARD 
11.22 5.40 5.00 0.00 12.000 3.85 9.50 4.38 
VBSP 7.64 3.23 7.43 3.05 6.55 2.02 6.75 2.80 
Other banks 13.75 4.79 - - - - 11.25 2.50 
Semi formal 
credit (46) 
5.83 2.16 2.29 1.38 6.17 1.75 6.93 1.47 
Of which 
TYM Fund 
6.15 2.13 1.83 0.75 7.00 0.87 7.29 0.96 
Phu Thuong 
Cooperative  
4.00 1.29 5.00 - 3.67 1.15 4.00 1.73 
Informal credit 
(76) 
4.48 3.15 3.41 1.34 2.72 0.61 5.31 3.63 
Of which 
Relatives and 
friends 
9.50 0.71 - - - - 9.50 0.71 
Moneylenders 5.03 3.00 4.13 2.18 2.25 0.35 6.67 3.14 
Shop keepers* 3.67 3.13 3.23 0.65 2.91 0.72 4.10 4.05 
ROSCAs 4.92 2.94 2.00 - 2.67 0.52 5.78 3.00 
Total credit 6.29 4.02 7.19 2.65 6.15 3.76 6.60 3.42 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
(*) including people or enterprises who provide credit in kind such as foods, agricultural input materials, building 
materials 
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Appendix 5: Average number of loans per sample household by credit sectors and household 
groups 
Total sample 
(n=45) 
Agricultural 
households 
(n= 7) 
Agricultural - non 
farm households 
(n=12) 
Non farm 
households 
(n=26) 
 
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Formal sector 1.16 0.73 1.29 0.49 1.58 0.51 0.92 0.74 
Semi formal 
sector 
1.02 0.49 1.00 0.58 1.00 0.60 1.04 0.34 
Informal 
sector 
1.69 0.99 1.86 1.21 1.25 0.62 1.85 0.97 
Total  3.87 1.37 4.14 0.90 3.83 0.83 3.81 1.33 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
Appendix 6:  Ratio of loan numbers by credit sector and household groups 
Total sample 
(n=45) 
Agricultural 
households (n=7) 
Agricultural - non 
farm households 
(n=12) 
Non farm 
households (n=26) 
 
Number 
of loans 
% Number 
of loans 
% Number 
of loans 
% Number 
of loans 
% 
Formal sector 52 100.00 9 17.31 19 36.54 24 46.15 
Semiformal 
sector 
46 100.00 7 15.22 12 26.09 27 58.70 
Informal 
sector 
76 100.00 13 17.11 15 19.74 48 63.16 
Whole credit 
market 
174 100.00 29 16.67 46 26.44 99 56.90 
Source: Household survey, 2009 
 
 
